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INSUFFICIENT attention has been paid to one aspect and consequence of the failure of the American liners to sail from New York. The company which owns these boats has a contract with the government of the United States to maintain a regular weekly mail service between New York and Liverpool. The object of this contract is obvious. At a time when it was more profitable to operate ocean liners under other than the American flag, the government was willing to pay a private corporation liberally for the purpose of keeping alive a regular American mail route to Europe. Thus the American line was operating in a very real sense a national service. All over the world mail-carrying has been made a government monopoly because the certainty, celerity and cheapness of postal communication is essential to the safety of a modern state. The American nation could tolerate the idea of allowing most of its foreign trade to be carried in alien boats, but it could not tolerate the idea of intrusting entirely to other nations the business of keeping open our mail communications with Europe. As long as the mails were traveling in part under the American flag our citizens were not wholly dependent on foreign governments for the privilege of communicating with their associates abroad. At present we are so dependent. The humiliating aspect of the existing situation is the suspension of this vital service. Our government has broken with Germany and threatened war in order to prevent the high seas from becoming hostile territory during war; yet it has submitted to the interruption of that part of our intercourse with Europe which above all others is most important. If it were not for English or French assistance no American would now be able to communicate by mail with his friends and relatives abroad. If it were not for English or French assistance our government could not communicate by mail with its representatives in London and Paris. And the government assumes responsibility for this interruption of service by consenting to a non-fulfilment of its contract by the American line. The contract was written in part for the purpose of securing mail communication with Europe in case European nations were at war and the United States was not. The United States is not at war. Yet we leave to a nation which is at war the transportation of our mails.

IN the fortnight or more following the break with Germany events have not happened as most people anticipated. It was believed certain that within a few hours or days at least an "overt act," in the sense of a spectacular outrage, would occur. One ship, at least, the California, was sunk, and it was only sheer accident that no American lives were lost. For the rest, so far as one can see, neutral shipping has either stayed in port, or avoided the danger zone, or been attacked in such a way as not to startle the rather saturated sensibilities of our people. A few American ships are now venturing against the German threat, the Philadelphia has sneaked through unmolested, and the larger American ships are held in port. Three great factors have probably combined to prevent

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for the moment a sensational tragedy, and just what part each of those factors has played we do not of course know. The first is the vigilance and efficiency of the British navy which so far has kept "intensified warfare" from being much more intense than the warfare against shipping in the month of December. The second is the terrorization of the neutrals which is in large measure accomplishing Germany's purpose. The third and most doubtful factor is that the German government may have issued secret orders to spare certain ships when the American government and American press began to talk of war. But if there has been any slackening we may be entirely certain that it is not due to Mr. Bryan, Mr. Mann, Mr. Moore or the Emergency Peace Federation, but to the preparations of the government, the meetings to mobilize the national resources, the advance of the Chamberlain military training bill, the fine temper of the German-American leaders, the attitude of most of the press, and the refusal of Mr. Wilson to confuse the issue by parleying through the Swiss minister.

THE governing idea is that the highways which bind together the western nations shall not be broken either by force or by threat. This means in the first place that ships shall actually sail, that the intercourse is maintained and the submarine kept at bay. But it means something more than that. It means that the psychological terrorism which Germany has tried to create shall be dissipated by energetic defiance. The German government is using fear as a weapon in exactly the same way as it would use a torpedo or a machine gun. It is hoping to avoid the physical cost of dragging neutrals into the war by drawing upon the immense prestige which its militarism has acquired. So far as the small neutrals adjacent to Germany are concerned, the victory by prestige is being won. But we should be laying up infinite trouble for the future if we allowed Germany's prestige to impose on us now. Successful resistance to it means that the highways shall be open and shipping unafraid. This is the end we are compelled to pursue whether or not it is called war.

THERE has been much talk of a press cabal to railroad the country into war, or at least of a sudden jingoism and an indecent haste to abandon reason and fight. It is a serious charge, and in so far as it falls upon The New Republic we have only this to say: the peace worth having cannot be built on successful terrorism; it cannot be made on the defeat of France and England by a victorious Germany; it cannot be made by the triumph of the dearest weapon of the Pan-German; it cannot be made by the betrayal of the highway on which the Atlantic nations live. There is a time when compromise and submission merely breed violence and tyranny, and in all soberness that time is now. A labor union which submits and submits and submits merely increases the strength of the exploiter. It is only when labor is strong enough to command respect that it can bargain as an equal. So it is with this nation to-day. If we should fail to defy and finally to assist in breaking the German threat, nothing we could ever say about peace would impress itself upon the world. The prospect of a league for peace would be shattered, for no nation in Europe would feel that our participation in it was of any real value. Our pledge to resist aggression in the future would be discounted by our failure to resist it in the obvious present.

THE American government has served notice on the revolutionists in Cuba of its intention to support the existing government of the island and to hold the leaders of the revolt responsible for the damage which foreigners may suffer in their persons and property. Some such announcement was desirable and is, of course, aimed at depriving the revolution of all responsible support. But if it is not effective in putting a stop to the disorder, no time should be lost in adopting the measures necessary to carry out the threat. And it is improbable that taken by itself the notice will be effective. The leaders of a Cuban revolt are not usually people who can be held personally responsible for the result of their own violence; and in this case they must anticipate American interference and be ready to accept its consequences. The clear object of our government must be not to assess responsibility for violence, but to prevent the threatened loss of life and property. If it is going to intervene, the intervention should take place promptly and should be carried out with a sufficient force to make resistance hopeless. On the other hand, if intervention does follow, its objects surely cannot be limited merely to the restoration of order. There will have to be some inquiry into the merits of the quarrel. The American army cannot continue to perform police work for the Cuban government without being satisfied of the comparative justice of the law and the system which is being sustained by its exertions.

THE action of the suffrage leaders in offering the services of their organizations to either state or nation in the event of war has prompted a loud if not a large secession from the party ranks. As a matter of fact only about fifty out of the 500,000 members of the New York State Woman

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Suffrage Party have actually resigned, but of course their minority has nothing to do with the merits of the case. Their grievance can certainly not be considered negligible. At the very least a just measure of irritation must be allowed the pacifist who believes that her services have been offered for a purpose to which she is unalterably opposed and by someone who has no right to offer them. The action of Mrs. Whitehouse may be criticized because she volunteered the services of suffragists before consulting her organization as a whole. But the organization is actually with her and apart from the technical consideration there seems little reason for any actual secession. In no case have the suffrage leaders gone on record as favoring a declaration of war. They have simply stated what they would do in the event of war. This leaves all the latitude in the world for any member of the party to work her hardest against such a calamity. It is seemingly impossible that the United States should find it necessary to call for much active service from women's organizations. But within the last three years we have seen so much of the seemingly impossible occur that such phrases should be used warily. One of the seceding suffragists has been quoted as saying that she won't make a bandage until war is declared, and what she might do then she doesn't know. Yet most suffragists doubtless approve of the offer.

NOBODY seems to know much about the abilities of Mr. Thomas Gedney Patten, whom the President and Mr. Burleson have chosen to succeed Mr. Morgan as Postmaster of New York. His nomination can hardly be called the result of a single-minded passion for the good of the postal service. Neither is it a sign of willingness to please Tammany at any price. It looks like a decent compromise between a desire not to disappoint and estrange the Tammany leaders and a desire not to do the New York post office any harm. Although Mr. Patten is approved by the Tammany organization his reputation is otherwise stainless. Nothing, in fact, can be said against his reputation except that there is not very much of it. He has been an inconspicuous member of Congress. Those who know him best think well of his capacity for administration. In short, a fair-to-middling appointment, not conspicuously good and certainly not conspicuously bad. But why did Mr. Burleson improve the occasion by making vague charges against Mr. Morgan, the retiring postmaster? Mr. Morgan goes out of office either because his place is wanted by a good Democrat or because he has not been doing his job. He is entitled to criticism in a form that he can answer or else to freedom from criticism.

A PERSONAL letter has just come to us from an English friend who is well known in this country as a scholar and a thinker on British political problems. The writer is a profound liberal and an energetic supporter of the war who has at times been a sharp critic of America's attitude during the war. He says: "Peace without victory does not worry me. Victory is, as the Germans would say, a subjective conception. If we get the world we want, I should be happy if the Germans could look back on it as a victory too, as indeed in the deepest sense it would be." In all these difficult days no more reassuring words have been said anywhere, nor any which sets so high a standard for the temper of a people at war.

The Spectacle of Congress

CONGRESSMEN who express pained surprise at the increasing tendency of many of their fellow countrymen to speak of the national legislature with impatience and contempt would do well to consider carefully the existing justification for such an attitude. Never in the long and crowded annals of congressional ineptitude have they more completely betrayed their own inability to deal adequately with a great crisis and a great opportunity than during the past two weeks. At a moment when the country needed and craved either confirmation of its increasing resolution to intervene in the war for the purpose of keeping open its communications with Europe, or at least some enlightenment as to an honorable and effective alternative policy, the leaders in Congress have confined themselves to confusing counsel and to weakening resolution. The two houses of the national legislature have done nothing to make themselves useful to the country in its hour of need; and when in the course of time it becomes possible to settle accounts with existing institutions, American public opinion will remember the failure and ask Congress to settle the account.

The severance of diplomatic relations with Germany and the resulting threat of war happened toward the end of a short session, when the work of passing the regular appropriation bills was already in arrears. Such being the general situation, a vigilant and capable national legislature should have adopted one of two general courses of action. If it was resolutely opposed to intervening in the European war against Germany on the submarine issue, it would have prepared for the effective assertion of its legal authority over questions of war and peace. Its leaders would have conferred, reached an agreement upon some policy short of

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war, which would have satisfied their conception of what the national interest demanded, such, for instance, as that of armed neutrality, and then have fought out with the President the question of accepting their views. On the other hand if they were ready to follow the President, even though the trail led the country into the war, or if they shrank from assuming the responsibility of opposing his foreign policy, they could have adopted a very different but equally definite course of behavior. Realizing the grave danger of war, and the necessity of clearing for action, they could have adopted energetic measures to clean up outstanding controversies and routine business. In addition, they could have appointed a joint committee to discuss the military, naval and economic measures which ought to be adopted in the event of war, and to confer with the departmental heads in drawing up a national defense act, a general war policy and the legislation needed to carry it out. If Congress had behaved in either of these ways, it would have been vindicating the importance of the part which a national legislature ought to play in influencing or controlling the foreign policy of the country, and it would have been proving its ability to act up to the size of the part.

But Congress could not decide either intelligently to oppose or intelligently to support the President. A preponderance of the membership of both houses would perhaps have preferred some or perhaps even any handling of the submarine controversy with Germany which prevented the possibility of war, but they have never dared to act upon their convictions and organize for resistance to the President. And their fear of challenging the President's leadership has been due in part at least to their inability to agree upon a policy short of war which does not look like shirking or which is not as costly and dangerous as war itself. Congress has, consequently, fretted, fumed and cursed, but it has conformed. The Senate adopted the characteristic course, first approving by a large majority the President's treatment of the issue and then indicating a strong desire to escape the consequences of a rupture with Germany. The debate which preceded the endorsement of the administration was lacking in intellectual candor and substance, in moral elevation and even in rudimentary knowledge of the bearings of the submarine issue and of the relation thereto of America's world policy. And the passage of the resolution was followed in both Houses by a course of almost incredible futility in legislative behavior. Instead of clearing for action and concentrating attention upon preparation to meet the emergency, Congress allowed itself to remain immersed in the pettiest of legislative detail. We submit in another column the record of its recent behavior; and it is one of which not only congressmen but their constituents have reason to feel thoroughly ashamed. It exhibits, at a critical moment in the history of the country, a national legislature which is preoccupied with trivialities of administration, which will talk for days about pneumatic tubes or squabbles over patronage, yet which appropriates hundreds of millions without any adequate or relevant discussions of general financial policies or of the needs and policies of particular departments. A legislature which behaves in this way has lost all ability to distinguish between what is important and what is unimportant. It is worse than culpable. It is innocently but utterly incapable. It is bankrupt without admitting its own defalcation. It keeps on paying out depreciated paper without realizing that its issues cannot be converted into a sound currency.

A satisfactory explanation of this Congressional inability to free itself on a great occasion from the cheap frivolity of its regular practices would involve a treatise on the structure of the national government and on the history of party politics. The explanation turns, however, in general on the consequences of the attempt made by the framers of the Constitution to separate the executive from the legislature and to provide each of them with different and mutually exclusive spheres of action. The separation was unnatural and resulted in many extra-constitutional attempts to do away with its inconveniences. Our party system has, for instance, been very much influenced by the necessity of providing for harmonious coöperation between Congress and the presidency. Under the cover of the party system and for the ostensible purpose of exercising needed control over the executive, Congress has steadily appropriated executive functions until at the present time the most serious practical obstacle to the improvement in the administrative efficiency of American government is the inflexible determination of Congress itself to decide questions of administrative detail. It has allowed itself to be immersed in trivialities during the past two weeks, because trivialities transacted in committees have become the very breath of its nostrils. It lives upon petty appointments and appropriations which affect individuals and interests dominant in the legislator's district, but which are irrelevant to large questions of legislative policy. The legislator himself is unable to give consecutive and disinterested attention to questions of legislative policy, precisely because so much of his time is necessarily devoted to distributing among his personal and party associates the sour fruits of this congressional encroachment on the business of administration.

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Congress, however, is paying dearly for its usurpation. Of late years the presidency has been assuming a general direction of legislative policy which the framers of the Constitution hardly contemplated. The legislative ineptitude of Congress created a need of leadership in legislation which the executive was driven to satisfy and against which Congress revolts whenever it can, but revolts in vain. Initiative in legislation and in all questions of general policy has passed to the presidency, and this initiative is more complete and more authoritative concerning questions of foreign than concerning questions of domestic policy. The President represents the nation in its dealing with other countries. Congress finds it extremely difficult to resist any policy in relation to foreign affairs which is proposed by the executive; and in fixing the responsibility for the recent failure of Congress to rise to its opportunities and responsibilities this partial disability must be taken into account. Nevertheless the ultimate disability of Congress cannot be traced to any necessary subserviency to the presidency. It is disabled as a consequence of its own aggression on the executive power and of its inability to recognize its own errors. It has cheapened its functions by its manner of exercising them. It attracts to its service second-rate men because it affords no sufficient opportunity for first-rate men to display their abilities. It will never recover its dignity and competence as a deliberate representative body with control over the legislative policy of the country until it abandons its attempt to participate in administration. In actual practice the attempt brings with it a Congress composed of purveyors of patronage and pork who naturally are unable to understand any aspect of the submarine issue except its immediate inconvenience and danger, who cannot support the President without subservience and who cannot oppose him without factious ignorance.

If the Submarine Succeeds

THE submarine warfare is a failure, we are being assured. The British navy is said to have the menace in hand. All this is very reassuring, though it is early to abandon ourselves completely to feelings of security. But suppose that the submarine proves as effective as the Germans must have anticipated when they proclaimed a policy which strained relations with us to breaking. Suppose that England has actually been isolated, reduced to a condition where starvation is imminent, forced to subscribe to such a peace as an all-victorious Germany may dictate. What would this mean to us? It is only by meeting this question frankly that we shall be able to determine whether in suppressing the submarine England is fighting merely her own battle, or our battle as well. Only so can we determine whether we are justified in standing idly by, more or less sympathetic spectators, while England struggles to provision herself, or whether it is our national business to see that England is provisioned. Our reading of the neutrality law, ever since the war began, has been partial to England. We have acquiesced in the British blockade; we have evinced a readiness to go all lengths to curb the submarine. We have foregone the right we claimed to send bread to Germany. We have insisted on our right to send munitions to England. We have made hundreds of millions of war profits by this procedure. Was this our motive? Or do we recognize that England's fight is in a fundamental sense our fight? We shall be forced to recognize this once we entertain the hypothesis of England really beaten.

With England actually in the grip of starvation, there could be no talk of a peace on the basis of the status quo ante. Vae victis will be the cry of the Germans as it might well be that of their enemies, if Germany were crushed. The British belief that there can be no peace in the world until the German military power is sapped is not a whit more deeply rooted than the German belief that there can not be a lasting peace until the British financial power and naval supremacy are overthrown. If Germany could dictate a peace to England, its first article would be aimed at the British navy. Its second article would be aimed at the British colonial empire, upon which the financial might of England is in no small measure dependent.

It may be protested that all the Germans want is Mesopotamia and the freedom of the seas. But the Germans expected to be accorded a paramount position in Mesopotamia if the war ended in a draw. The Germans are not a people to underestimate the value of colonies and of a ring of coaling stations encircling the world. These England, starving, could be made to yield: would Germany refrain from demanding them? As for freedom of the seas, Germany enjoys it in time of peace. Can Germany trust to a mere treaty to assure herself freedom of the seas in time of war? We know the German view of the binding quality of treaties that may run counter to the national interest. Germany will feel assured of the freedom of the seas when England no longer has the physical means to dispute the right. England, defeated, would pay the price in ships.

What a completely successful submarine campaign would mean to the United States is suffi-

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ciently clear. We should be compelled to face an epoch of redistribution of the colonial dominions of the world. The British, French, Italian, Portuguese, and Belgian flags would gradually give way to the German. Colonial dominion is a perquisite of sea power; or at least, exists only by tolerance of sea power. The Dutch in the East Indies, the Belgians in the Congo, the French in Cochin China, ourselves in the Philippines, have no other security than the existing adjustment of forces under British naval hegemony. Convey the hegemony to Germany, and all the elements of our calculations are disturbed.

German victory would not merely mean a disturbance of relations throughout the seven seas. It would mean a change in those relations to the prejudice of our interests and those of the world as a whole. The old colonizing nations have gone far on the way to a liberal conception of their colonial obligations. In time of peace England reserves no differential advantage to her nationals. All the world trades freely in the British crown colonies. Germany is a new colonizing state and generations would be required to overcome the disposition she has already manifested to exploit colonies in her own exclusive interest. With Germany established in the position of mistress of the seas, our trade would encounter closed doors on every hand. Our shipping would be handicapped by manipulation of bunker coal supplies. And finally, what of our pretension to maintain freedom from imperial domination in the territories to our south? The sooner we should cancel the Monroe Doctrine the safer for us.

The passing of the power of England would be calamitous to the American national interest. It is as much our concern that England should not be beaten into surrender as it was England's concern that Belgium should not be brutally trampled under. We have provisioned and munitioned England—at a profit. Whatever our motives may have lacked we did, in so far, aid in resisting Germany's design against England.

Now the design has become more desperate and menacing. England, by redoubling her efforts, may defeat it completely. What is our national duty in the premises? To keep our ships at home until the British have cleared the seas, that we may trade again, with a profit? Or to proceed with all the force we can command, at whatever cost may be necessary, to defend our national interest in the existing adjustment of sea power and colonial dominion? Certainly, if there is the least chance of Germany's success in her submarine campaign, vastly more is at stake for us than was at stake for Germany when she decided to back up Austria in her Balkan quarrel. More is at stake for us than was at stake for England when she threw in her lot with France and Russia in defense of Belgium. We may be blind to this relation between our interest and that of England. The Entente Allies are not blind to it; nor, for that matter, is Germany. We may remain passive and save ourselves the anxieties of a state bordering on war, if not actually assuming the form of war. If we do we shall have gained, in the world's councils, the position of a state too stupid to perceive even its own vital interests or too lethargic to make an effort to conserve them.

Agricultural Mobilization

THE German note has loosened a flood of emergency bills upon Congress. Their aim is to speed up naval conservation, to create a new army, to strengthen our coast defenses, and most particularly to give the government drastic control of transportation and manufacture in the event of hostilities. But not one of them relates specifically to our most likely and important source of power —the mobilization of the food supply.

For a generation our agricultural output has failed to keep pace with the growth of population. Farmers have constantly complained that this was largely due to a shortage of farm labor. The cities have been draining the farms of their youth. And since the autumn of 1914 the drawing power of commerce and industry has been increased by everything that the promise of high wages and steady employment could do. If we go to war, this shortage will be further aggravated by enlistment or conscription. Unless we prepare against it, the disparity between agricultural production and the demand for food will become increasingly acute.

It is a recognized commonplace that successful wars to-day must be fought with factories as well as with ships and guns. The equal importance of agricultural mobilization is not so generally recognized. Her failure to take this into account was one of England's principal sources of weakness during the first years of the war. In 1914 Germany's agricultural production per square mile of agricultural area was three times that of the United Kingdom. During the months of voluntary enlistment England put herself at a further disadvantage by permitting the indiscriminate withdrawal of men from her farms. As late as the autumn of 1916 her farmers complained that they were not able to harvest even such crops as they had raised. The government then offered to release men from the front on a twenty-day furlough. But the farmers insisted that what they needed was

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not just men, but experienced farm labor. Two years after the outbreak of war England had failed to mobilize her agricultural army.

This neglect reacted injuriously upon all industry and especially upon the production of munitions. Wages increased, but they did not keep pace with the increased cost of living. Three items in the London Times of January 12th, 1916, throw light on the labor troubles on the Clyde which seriously threatened to cripple the navy. The first was a recommendation of the Advisory Council on War Output that no further increase of wages could be allowed because four and a half million wage-workers had already received an average increase of 3s 6d weekly. The second was the refusal on this ground to grant the Joint Shipyard Trades a wage increase of fifteen per cent. The third was the statement that the cost of food had gone up thirty-five per cent. It required the combined effort of Lloyd George and Premier Asquith to prevent the paralysis of the Clyde shipyards. Owing to facts like these England has been plagued with strikes and threats of strikes, which have had their direct effect upon her operations at the front.

And, of course, England's food problem has been aggravated by a parallel neglect of agricultural output, production and distribution in the United States. The abnormal rise of wages in our munition centers made heavy drafts upon our already depleted agricultural army. Food prices soared. We had an epidemic of strikes. Some manufacturers were unable to complete their contracts on time. During 1916 many manufacturers announced a voluntary increase in wages. But the increase in wages throughout the country has been much less than the increase in food prices, and especially in the cost of the basic commodities upon which wage-working families principally depend. If we permit this evil to grow it will not only bring widespread and unnecessary suffering, but will seriously cripple our military operations.

The President has just ordered the Federal Trade Board and the Department of Agriculture to investigate the "allegations before committees of Congress that the course of trade in important food products is not free, but is restricted and controlled by artificial and illegal means." And so we are about to begin another of our chronic investigations into the evils of food speculation. Certainly food speculation is a serious problem. But such investigations take time and the spring planting, like war, is almost upon us. And how are we to check speculation, or institute improved systems of distribution, if we do not even know what our food supply is or where it is located? These are things that except with respect to a few major staples we have never tried to find out. What are our present available agricultural resources? Is our yield per capita much greater than Germany's? And as for agricultural laborers, we have not taken a census of them since 1909.

Had Germany been equally slack, she would have been starved out long ago. Her amazing economic resistance is due not only to summary measures against speculation, such as the fixing of maximum prices of food, but especially to the fact that she has organized her agricultural army and counted every cow, pig, fish, straw and kernel of corn. On the twenty-second of October, 1915, she took a census of bread-corn, oats and flour; on the eleventh of November, a national oil and fat census. On December 1st she counted all animals and fixed the prices of such seemingly unimportant commodities as venison, hares and cock-pheasants. On the fourth of December, having taken full account of these stocks, she fixed the wholesale and retail prices of white cabbages and turnips, green cabbage and kale, savoy and red cabbage, carrots and onions. And on the next day of carp, tench, pike, red-eyes and fin-scales.

And of course she counted every parcel of open ground and considered what crops each acre was best fitted to yield. She counted her brooks, rivers, ponds and lakes and safeguarded their schools of fish. She granted liberal aid to her rural coöperative societies. She organized her supply of steam plows, motor plows, reapers, scythes, sickles and spades, and supervised their effective distribution, exchange and use. Nothing was left to chance; she superseded the law of supply and demand. Notwithstanding these precautions the food problem in Germany is undoubtedly serious. But one of the most amazing facts of the war is that in spite of the blockade and the fact that in normal times Germany raises only four-fifths of the food she consumes, potatoes, bread and even meat are cheaper in Germany to-day than they are in England or the United States.

Under the shadow of war it is imperative that the nation's best intelligence should be directed to the equipment of the army and navy through industrial mobilization. But if war comes, our most effective contribution to a decisive peace will be to supply food at reasonable cost and in increasing quantities to our own people and to the Allies. Before it adjourns Congress should empower the President to appoint a body of experts with ample authority to regulate food distribution, to fix prices if that is necessary to check speculation, and to mobilize our agricultural resources, including men, machinery and idle land. For agriculture, in war as in peace, is at the basis of national security.

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Taking the Referendum Seriously

A GOOD many people who take war as the sum of all villainies have seized upon the idea of a referendum to prevent war. Their object, international or otherwise, is to divert attention from the threats of Germany to the illiberalism of those who wish to resist the threats. It is hoped that those who oppose a referendum about our foreign relations will be jockeyed into the position of jingoes trying to stampede an unwilling people into war. The fact is, however, that no sane man would ever propose the referendum as a normal method of controlling foreign policy. It is proposed at this moment only as an emergency measure.

It is estimated that a referendum would take at the very least twenty-five days. Is there any one in this country who could frame a question now that would mean something about the end of March? Does any one know what will be the situation at the end of March? Suppose we decide now that in three and a half weeks we shall vote on whether (a) American ships shall sail in the barred zone and (b) American citizens shall sail on any ship in the barred zone. What shall we do in the meantime? Shall we stay home and grant Germany practically a month of absolute victory, or shall we sail and be attacked without resisting? Suppose the referendum says yes—Americans should sail under government protection—are we to consider that the vote approves American protection to ships carrying conditional contraband only or absolute contraband as well? If the vote is no, what is our government to do if Germany then declares the whole Atlantic ocean a barred zone? Shall we wait another twenty-five days and vote again?

The referendum is not advisory in any honest sense of the word, because the decision of the government must be composed of an intricate series of problems which cannot be isolated. On most of the points the answer is not yes or no but a course of action with many ramifications of detail. A government dependent on referendum for advice about every crucial point could survive only in a world where magic kept everything frozen tight while the referendum was being taken. In a world of swift action, of surprises, of intrigue, there can be neither safety nor success for an administration which had no power to act.

If the referendum were taken seriously, let us imagine the state of the country while it was being held. We should have a furious campaign with the President, his cabinet, Mr. Roosevelt and the leading Republicans stumping the country against Mr. Bryan and Mr. Mann, the Socialist Party and Mr. Max Eastman. Does anyone suppose it would be a pleasant spectacle or that it would leave behind it anything but profound bitterness and disorganization? It would be an exhibition of utter folly, and at the end the President would not be one whit the wiser as to how he ought to act on the thousand and one questions he has to decide. Vast sums of money would be poured out on both sides, and the forces of sanity would soon be submerged. The protectionist newspaper advertising campaign in the last ten days of a recent campaign would be mild compared to what we should see.

In the course of the campaign unscrupulous propaganda would be conducted against both Germany and England and the hyphenate question raised in all its violence. We should hear about the menace of Japan; wild words would be uttered about Mexico. We should be saying the things which would deeply embitter not only Germany but the nations whose friendship we need to cultivate. The infectious phrases would be plastered around the world poisoning relationships everywhere. Innocent as it looks at first sight, the referendum would be a disaster far greater than the kind of war in which we may possibly be engaged.

The proposal is a product of just that irresponsibility of mind, that poverty of imagination, that failure of realistic thinking which has cast such odium on the word pacifism. If men who love peace and want it behave this way, how are liberals ever to call themselves pacifists? It is a tragic suggestion, for it exhibits in the rawest form a total bankruptcy of ideas. Those who would wish to call themselves pacifists and work for a peace through statesmanship are merely discredited and thrown back by so empty a proposal in so grave a crisis.

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The Conscription of Income

A Sound Basis for War Finance

IF the United States enters the great war a government loan will be immediately necessary in order to provide the treasury with a comfortable working balance and to meet initial military expenditure. Thereafter all the funds required for the war, colossal in amount as they are certain to be, can and should be secured from taxation levied during the conflict and not by means of loans. The taxation policy is far more equitable and at the same time would make possible a far more speedy and complete mobilization of the industrial forces of the community in support of its armies in the field. To raise the funds for the immense expenditure of modern warfare by means of loans involves a country in serious financial difficulties which can be escaped if the taxation policy is adopted. Obviously the validity of these sweeping statements must be proved up to the hilt, but fortunately the case for taxation is overwhelmingly strong.

On purely financial grounds war finance based on loans is unsatisfactory because it occasions a rapid rise of prices thus enhancing the money cost of a war. War loans would not cause an advance in the level of prices, if subscribers to the loans made payment entirely either with accumulated funds on hand or with savings made from current income during the period that the proceeds of each successive loan were being expended. In these circumstances the abnormally large demand of a government for goods and labor would be roughly offset by the curtailed demand of the people generally. But the funds secured by governments through war loans are never derived entirely from savings on hand or those which become available while the proceeds of a loan are being expended. Voluntary saving is never sufficiently inclusive and rigorous. Many subscribers to war loans borrow from banks the funds required to meet their commitments, pledging other property and even the war loan itself. The banks adopt a liberal patriotic loan policy and also subscribe largely on their own account. These transactions, the borrowing from banks and the investment by banks, occasion expansion in the volume of credit, both in the form of bank notes and of deposits, and are the most potent single cause of the general advance in prices during periods of war.

Purchasing power in the possession of the people is reduced by a war loan, but not to the full extent of the purchasing power secured by the government. With this purchasing power the warring government enters the market for goods and labor in competition with its own citizens. The government demand is so insistent that it is not lessened by advancing prices. There is simply a more speedy exhaustion of the proceeds of the loan. On the other hand the demand of the people for goods and labor is reduced in consequence of rising prices. Through this roundabout process a smaller part of the total current products of industry is consumed by the people in the ordinary ways of peace, and a larger part in the shape of military material of all sorts is secured by the government and consumed in the channels of war.

Although there is commonly an increase in voluntary saving during the course of a war, it is unlikely to be sufficient to counteract fully various influences tending toward a continuous upward movement of prices with each successive loan. With the progress of a long war the output of commodities of all kinds can hardly fail to undergo some diminution, as more and more men are required for military service. No corresponding contraction in the volume of the purchasing media is, however, to be anticipated. On the contrary, as a means of facilitating the marketing of successive loans, a policy of continuous, even though moderate, credit expansion is practically certain to be adopted. An easy money market is a desirable, one may even say, an essential condition for carrying through the distribution of a government loan among investors. Credit contraction is naturally out of the question. Thus while the vital importance of strict economy is being everywhere urged, these easy monetary conditions enable many to satisfy their patriotic impulses by borrowing the funds which they subscribe to war loans, and at the same time postpone the sacrifice of accustomed luxuries and comforts to a more convenient season.

It is also to be noted that the initial advance in prices works against that general discontinuance of all unnecessary consumption, in order to subscribe to war loans, which is needful if still further price advances are to be avoided. A war inevitably causes radical changes in many incomes. Those engaged in the production of articles for which there is an intense government demand secure exceptionally large wages and profits. Meanwhile the incomes of those engaged in a large number of other pursuits remain stationary or decline. Changes in income would be numerous even though the level of prices remained stationary. Both the number and extent of these changes are, however,

NORTHAMPTON MASSACHUSETTS

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much increased in consequence of rising prices. While the real income of the vast majority is reduced, that of a considerable number is enlarged in some instances to an extraordinary extent. These undeserved and temporary gains tempt many to extravagance in consumption. During the tragic course of the present war, the increasing readiness of the peoples of the warring countries to impose additional taxation is at least in part due to the desire to check positively indecent extravagance on the part of those whose incomes have been thus undeservedly increased.

Borrowing as the principal means of financing a war is then practically certain to involve a general advance in prices, which in turn increases the money cost of a war and also causes much undesirable variation in incomes. Against war finance based on borrowing there are, however, other and far more serious objections. It is manifestly unjust and inequitable because it gives not only to property acquired before a war, but also to income received during its progress, a far higher degree of consideration relative to life than is accorded to them in times of peace. In adopting the borrowing policy, a government accepts in the field of finance the voluntary principle without qualification. Interest as a reward is offered at whatever rate is required in order to secure the necessary funds. An analogous situation would present itself if governments relying entirely upon voluntary enlistment offered successive increases in the pay of soldiers, whenever the supply of volunteers was inadequate. Voluntary enlistment from patriotic motives has been tried, but its inadequacy as well as its lack of equality in sacrifice has been made apparent during the course of the present war. Compulsory service will certainly be the policy adopted by belligerent countries in all future wars. Immediate military exigencies compel resort to this method of raising armies.

Conscription of men should logically and equitably be accompanied by something in the nature of conscription of current income above that which is absolutely necessary. The obligation that each citizen furnish the state in times of war a large portion of his current income manifestly would impose no more oppressive burden than the obligation of military service. Consider for a moment the contrast under the borrowing method of war finance between a soldier in receipt of an income of $2,500 before a war and his neighbor who remains at home in continued receipt of a similar amount. The civilian reduces his expenditures in every possible way and subscribes a total of $3,000 to war loans. He is rewarded with a high rate of interest to which his soldier neighbor must contribute his quota in higher taxes if he is fortunate enough to return from the front. The contrast becomes still greater if, as often happens, the income of the stay-at-home increases during the war, and if he is able to secure a superior position. On the other hand, the soldier often finds it difficult to secure a position as good as that from which he was taken at the beginning of the war.

But if borrowing as the principal means of financing a war is so evidently unjust it is pertinent to inquire why this policy has been so generally adopted and approved. The explanation is in part found in a common misconception regarding the relative importance of the various sources from which the funds subscribed to war loans are derived. Not infrequently it seems to be supposed that war expenditure involves something like an equivalent devotion to war uses of capital and other wealth which was in existence before the outbreak of hostilities. On the contrary, the greater part of war expenditure is in fact derived from current income, most of which but for the war would have been devoted to the satisfaction of individual wants and so completely consumed.

General acquiescence in the policy of borrowing for war purposes is by no means to be attributed solely to misconceptions regarding the relative importance of the sources from which funds subscribed to war loans are derived. It is also commonly believed that by borrowing, the burden of war costs is shifted from the present to future generations. Such shifting is illusory. A burden can indeed be placed on future generations but the generation conducting the war does not escape. A nation at the end of the war is poorer by the amount that its capital and other wealth is less than it would have been if there had been no war. This loss is inevitably greater if the borrowing rather than the taxation policy is adopted; because, as we have seen, borrowing does not reduce unnecessary consumption to the greatest possible extent.

Taking a community as a whole, a war debt is, of course, in no sense an asset. This would be evident enough if the ownership of the debt was distributed among the people in exact proportion to the additional taxes which they must pay in order to meet interest and sinking fund requirements. Owing to the manner in which the debt is in fact held it alters to the disadvantage of the great majority of the people the distribution of the total annual income of the community. On the return of peace those who serve in the armies will, generally speaking, enjoy a smaller share in the national dividend because they were deprived of the opportunity to earn income from which savings might be made for subscriptions to war loans. Large numbers of those who remain at

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home, either because of a decline in their incomes or on account of advancing prices, are also unable to save their quota of the war debt, and consequently find themselves in a less favorable position than at the beginning of the war. A fortunate and perhaps more thrifty minority become owners of the government debt and enjoy a rent charge on the income of the community which continues until the principal of their claim is returned to them.

But although borrowing is an inequitable means of financing a great war, it has one advantage which cannot be questioned. It works. If a people are heartily in favor of a war, directly through the funds subscribed to loans and indirectly through the forced economy of those with stationary or declining incomes occasioned by rising prices, governments can secure command of a very large proportion of the labor force in a country, and the use of much of its capital. Large armies can be formed and supported and enormous quantities of military supplies can be produced. Even though the burden is unevenly distributed the transfer of labor and capital from the activities of peace to those of war can be successfully accomplished.

It boots nothing, therefore, to dilate upon the equity and remote advantages of taxation over borrowing, unless it can be shown that by some other method the productive forces of a country can be at least as speedily transferred and as effectively exerted in the production of the large and varied supplies of material required in the conduct of a modern war. But it is here precisely that the overwhelming military advantage of the taxation policy becomes manifest. By checking unnecessary consumption at the outset of hostilities, adequate supplies of the articles required for military purposes can be more readily provided. Take coal, for example: much coal in the various warring countries would have been saved if passenger traffic had been reduced to a minimum, to say nothing of its consumption in the production and transportation of unnecessary articles of individual consumption. Similarly in the case of blankets and uniforms. A nearly complete cessation of civilian purchases of clothes would unquestionably have made available much labor for the production of adequate supplies of military clothing. Thanks to the curtailment of individual consumption enforced by taxation, the industrial forces of a country can be far more speedily and effectively utilized for war purposes than is possible under the borrowing policy of war finance.

All the various considerations of which account must be taken in framing a permanent taxation policy have no bearing when it is a question of taxation for a limited period and for a specific purpose. Accepted canons of taxation and most economic principles have no application amid the conditions which develop during a great modern war. It is not necessary, for example, to take account of the effect of onerous taxation on saving and on the investment of capital. It is the avowed purpose of the state to secure through taxation all that can be saved. Onerous income taxes will not weaken the motive for maintaining the capital which was in existence before the war, because it will become the basis for the accustomed return to its owners upon the restoration of peace. In any event, whether the state borrows or taxes there will be less capital at the end of a war than at the beginning. But, as we have seen, a greater part of the capital of a country will be absorbed under the borrowing policy, because it does not reduce individual consumption to the greatest possible extent.

It would seem at first sight that if no income could be saved for investment during a war serious difficulty might be encountered in securing the necessary additions to plants required for the production of munitions and other military supplies. Experience during the present war, however, proves quite conclusively that those requirements are too great and immediate to wait upon the slow processes of the adjustment of facilities of supply to demand working through prices and business profits. The warring governments have been obliged to undertake the erection or direct control of plants and the organization of production, not only of munitions, but also of other indispensable articles. Much has, of course, been done by private enterprise, but commonly under conditions which guaranteed against loss. Both these methods would be equally feasible even though there were no new savings available for investment. Within moderate limits the cost of converting plant to war uses could be charged as at present to operating costs and not to capital account. Capital also would become available for investment through the liquidation of current assets in branches of industry unfavorably affected by the war. It would also be quite possible, and indeed this has happened during the present war, for governments to make advances of funds to private concerns for capital expenditure.

During a great war it would also seem that the chance of making large profits is not needed to secure persistent effort and readiness to assume business risks. Patriotic motives in the business and financial world even now in some degree take the place of ordinary economic motives even though no strong appeal has been made to them. The evident justice of a policy under which no one would reap an economic benefit from a war would

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certainly stimulate the vast majority of people to greater efforts. In England, for example, during the present war, the large gains and extravagance of a few have caused serious discontent in labor circles, a grievance which was in some degree finally removed by means of the excess profits tax.

It is also to be noted that business risks are far less than in times of peace, even under conditions as they develop when a war is financed by borrowing; and these risks would be still further reduced if the taxation policy were adopted. In any event, the warring state takes a leading rôle in determining the direction of production. A large part of the total output of industry is in response to government orders. Those who supply the wayward demands of the few whose incomes have been increased by war do indeed incur serious risks. But if all income were heavily taxed there would be little demand of this character. Marketing risks would be reduced to a minimum, since the bulk of the labor and capital of the country would be employed in producing articles of necessary consumption and military supplies.

The abrupt curtailment of individual consumption, which would come with the adoption of this taxation policy, would occasion no serious disturbance in the labor markets. In all the warring countries it has been found necessary to utilize the labor of women to an unprecedented extent. The enormous number of men absorbed in the armies, together with the large government demand for goods, has much more than offset the reduction in the demand for labor in various peaceful pursuits.

It is of course impossible to determine in advance of experience just how far it would be possible to go in financing a war by taxes on income. Tentatively and mainly for illustrative purposes the following scheme of taxation may be suggested. All, or at least 95 per cent of all incomes in excess of the average annual income received during the two years preceding a war should go to the state. This proposal simply involves an extension of the excess profits tax which has been adopted very generally during the present war. In addition, ordinary income should be taxed "to the bone," but not beyond the point which would still leave every class of taxpayers sufficient income to maintain the essentials of its customary standard of life. Let us assume as a starting point a special war tax of 10 per cent on incomes of $1,500 or perhaps $1,200 and of 15 per cent on incomes of $2,000, income between these limits being taxed at the higher rate. By successive stages the rates would be increased until 50 per cent of incomes of $40,000 and let us say, all incomes in excess of $100,000 were taken by the state during the period of the war. These taxes would after all represent nothing more than patriotic citizens might be expected and urged to save and to invest in government loans under the borrowing policy of war finance. The imposition of these taxes would, of course, require a reorganization of all war charity, but the alleviation of much of the distress occasioned by war which is now left to private benevolence is properly a government function and could be far more effectively handled through its agency. In addition to taxes on incomes, special taxes on a few articles entering into general consumption should be imposed. A tax on sugar of five cents a pound with correspondingly heavy taxes on tobacco and beverages, alcoholic and non-alcoholic, would presumably be sufficient for the purpose of reaching those whose incomes are too small to warrant resort to direct taxation. A high tax of say twenty-five cents a gallon on gasoline and on other commodities of which enormous quantities are required for military use might well be imposed.

It might also prove advisable to provide that the tax rates to be imposed at the outset should be at half the rates which would become effective at the end of a period of six months of war. By that time the initial disturbances occasioned by the outbreak of war would have passed and it would be possible to judge with some certainty whether the country was engaged in a long and arduous contest. As regards the proposed income taxes a single annual collection would be unsatisfactory on fiscal grounds. The enormous payments to be made might seriously dislocate the banking machinery of a country. Monthly or quarterly payments would in large measure meet those difficulties. Payment of the taxes at frequent intervals would also reduce to a minimum loss of revenue from irresponsible individuals who otherwise might spend in extravagant consumption the funds which should have been set aside to meet the tax on their incomes. It would also be desirable to provide that tax payments might be made in short-time interest-bearing obligations of the government. Purchases of these obligations by those subject to income tax would provide a reasonably steady supply of funds, probably quite as effectively as under the present financial policy based on borrowing.

The adoption of the taxation policy would not of course eliminate all changes in income during a war. It would, however, diminish the number of such changes and also confine them within narrower limits than is possible under the conditions of rapidly rising prices which are found whenever a war is financed by means of paper money or

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borrowing. Comparatively stable prices would facilitate the execution of the income-tax policy in two ways. In the first place, the amount of excess profits, as well as the number in receipt of such profits, would be far less considerable than has been the case in past wars. And second, the special war tax on ordinary income would occasion less disturbance, since the necessary curtailment of expenditure could be more exactly estimated by the people generally if something like the accustomed level of prices were maintained. To those in receipt of stationary incomes of moderate size, the proposed war taxes would be less burdensome than the deprivation resulting from the rise of prices under the borrowing policy in the countries now at war.

To finance a war to the greatest possible extent currently from taxation is just. It would place all citizens upon an equal footing in so far as war conditions will permit. It would leave the country in far better position to make preparation for and to conduct future wars if they unhappily should come. The return to peaceful activities would be enormously simplified. Taxation would then be somewhat more burdensome than before the war, but the increase would be insignificant in comparison with that which must be borne if the borrowing policy is adopted. Moreover, the proceeds of the additional taxes would be used chiefly to relieve the families of those who were killed or the soldiers who were incapacitated during the war. The danger that class antagonism might develop even to the point of revolutionary outbreaks would be eliminated. Finally the taxation policy would leave the country in a vastly better position for further industrial development, to compete in the markets of the world and above all to take up its social and other civilizing activities more nearly where they were interrupted at the outbreak of hostilities.

O. M. W. SPRAGUE.

Women and Votes in England

IN the early days of the war suffragists lived through a brief but bitter moment of pessimism. We thought that a world which had gone rattling back into barbarism must be less than ever disposed to admit the equal citizen rights of women. Force was rampant, and the idea of force had begun to penetrate the whole of the country's thinking. We seemed destined to live through a period in which the relation of men to women must become what it always has been in primitive warlike societies, the relation of the brave to his squaw, or at best of the knight to his lady. Through all our years of controversy the most ineffectual arrow in the anti-suffragist's old-world quiver has been the "physical-force argument." It was easy in times of peace to deal with his academic contentions that force is the basis of government, and ballots only paper substitutes for bullets—valid currency just so long as the counting of suffrages serves as a rough indication of the probable issue of a pitched battle. This crude Prussianism made no impression on the democracy, because the democracy in England believed on the whole that our civilization had evolved beyond the military stage. There seemed, however, a real danger that the phenomenon of a world war might popularize this prehistoric vein of thought. If the chief function of government is still defense, the argument that only the fighting citizen should vote gained a certain plausibility.

In point of fact, the thinking of the English people has not moved on these lines at all. There are moments when one is tempted to thank Providence that we are not a logical nation. It has not followed these lines partly because the heightening of national feeling everywhere obliterates barriers, and makes a temporary sense of fraternity, and still more because we have made the discovery that in a modern war, women are nearly as indispensable as men. The most resolute anti-suffragist has to admit that without the millions of women who have made munitions and replaced men in industry, the war could not have been carried on. The superb display of endurance, competence and public spirit which women have given has impressed their most hardened opponents. The surprise which these people express is a little amusing to the rest of us. Where were they, all these years, that they so mistook the temper of the modern woman? The broad fact is that in war the enhancement of the tribal instinct tells in favor of all the less considered sections of the clan. In some degree the Irish and the Indians have profited by this sharp rise in our national temperature. At fever heat every nation is inclined to be generous. The better prospects for franchise reform are another symptom of this same phenomenon, and sanguine people still hope to see it at work in Russia. The practical problem is to persuade nations to act while this generous temper lasts. Unfortunately every conservative society has evolved a maxim which preserves it from these rash excesses of generosity. It is everywhere agreed that the solution of inter-

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nal questions should be postponed until peace restores our normal egoism.

That women will be enfranchised in England, possibly before the end of the war, certainly within a few years of its close, seems to me a moral certainty. One personal force alone prevented it during the four hopeful years before the war—the obstinate will of Mr. Asquith. American readers may be unfamiliar with the details of this singular history. There were several reasons for the ultimate failure of the Conciliation bill in 1912—the equivocal conduct of Mr. Lloyd George, and the reckless impatience of the "militants" among them. One reason alone was decisive and fatal, if I may speak from my own intimate experience as the secretary of the committee which drafted and promoted this compromise. That reason was the personal ascendancy of Mr. Asquith over his own party, and still more over the Irish Nationalists. The bill, after two triumphant endorsements, was defeated by a narrow majority (during the accidental absence of half the Labor party) through the sudden action of the Irish party, who voted in a body against it, solely because they believed that its success might have led to Mr. Asquith's resignation. That always seemed to me a simple opinion on their part; Mr. Asquith's foible was never a readiness to relinquish office. But the broad fact was that they were nervous about Home Rule, and wished to please the only English statesman whom they really trusted. To-day Mr. Asquith is himself a convert. His adhesion to the women's cause has been handsomely and publicly made, and the best of all is that he has urged their enfranchisement before we face our post-war problems of reconstruction. This means that when we return to our normal party life, the Liberals can no longer escape the official adoption of women's suffrage as a part of their program, and in franchise questions it is the tradition of the Tory party, at the psychological moment, to "steal the Radicals' clothes." Our gains in the press are hardly less notable than our gains in Parliament. Mr. Garvin, who is probably the most influential individual publicist on the Unionist side, is an active and decided convert. Rumor speaks of Lord Northcliffe's conversion, and it is a fact that since the war the Times has written nothing against women's suffrage, while the Evening News has even advocated it. I question whether our Dictator really means to give much active help to the movement, but he is no longer the active opponent that he was, and at the worst his influence will now tell only for delay.

In spite of the party-truce and the general agreement to postpone contentious questions, it is barely possible for this Parliament to avoid a reform of the franchise. The voters' register has lapsed into chaos during the war, and most of our soldiers and munitions-workers have lost their qualifications. To elect a new Parliament, for five years, on the basis of a register which now contains only an imperfect list of the elderly men left in England, is morally impossible. One might devise an emergency bill to reinstate the soldiers who have lost their qualifications by enlisting, but apart from the technical difficulties of this apparently simple act of justice, the organic reform of the franchise is scandalously overdue. The speaker's conference has now completed its report, and the result is to show that on all the contentious questions except votes for women, a good though moderate compromise can be reached. Though the property vote will linger in the dual qualification for business premises, and the graduate vote is retained, the conference really has laid down for men the foundations of a rational and democratic franchise—a simple residential qualification of six months, the beginning of proportional representation for the large towns, equal electoral areas, and the great reduction in the cost of elections. The working out of this plan demands time, for the new areas will have to be delimited, but since agreement has been reached in a conference which included all parties, the tendency will be to demand the prompt introduction of the bill, and its rapid passage by consent. But on one point the conference, which included some incorrigible anti-suffragists, could not agree. It will present, outside its agreed scheme, only a majority resolution in favor of the principle of women's suffrage, while on the exact form in which women should be enfranchised even the majority was not agreed.

The movement has faced no more hopeful but no more perplexing tactical problem than this. Many circumstances tell in its favor—the recent conversions, the national atmosphere of fraternity, the general readiness to face big reconstructions, the oblivion which has now covered the irritation caused by militancy. On the other hand the suffrage societies are all "de-mobilized," and many of their best workers are absorbed in the patriotic activities, or scattered as nurses in hospitals as far away as Saloniki, and the Urals. There can be no effective agitation while the war lasts. The anti-suffragists and the luke-warm suffragists in Parliament (who together form a majority of the House) will argue that it is possible to proceed with the agreed resolutions and the speaker's conference now, but to add this big contentious issue would "divide the country." They will offer some later chance of dealing with the question after the

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war, perhaps in this Parliament, but more probably in the next. Against these specious dilatory tactics, there is only one possible course to take. It is that keen suffragists should refuse to support any measure of franchise reform from which women are excluded. A bill on the lines of this agreed report will involve a great numerical increase of the male electorate, and therefore an aggravation of the women's grievance. Obstruction, however, is rarely a popular strategy. In this case it would look like refusing the vote to soldiers, and only a small fraction of the House will adopt it. The decision really rests with the Cabinet, and it is divided. Lord Curzon is, since Lord Cromer's death, the most distinguished of our unyielding "die-hard" opponents. Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Henderson and Mr. Bonar Law are suffragists. Of the three, Mr. Henderson alone has a record which inspires confidence, but he is no match in ability or prestige for his fellow dictators. This Cabinet will not itself adopt and further the reform. It may, however, leave the House free to deal with it, but everything turns on the "when" and the "how." A Reform bill which does not include women in its first draft cannot by our recent English rules of procedure be amended to include them. The government must therefore itself include women in the bill, and then leave the House free to exclude them, if it so desires. That method would certainly mean victory in the House of Commons, though the Lords might reverse its vote. A separate bill is the only other available method.

The real difficulty is still that suffragists are divided as to how many women should be enfranchised at the first step. Seven years ago, when the Conciliation bill was drafted, the whole suffrage movement was prepared to accept a very modest instalment which would have served as the thin edge of the wedge—hardly more than a million women voters. Delay had made a compromise on those timid lines unacceptable, and none of us would propose it to-day. The effective demand is now for full adult suffrage with no differentiation between the sexes. Unluckily so large a demand alarms the cautious English temperament, and many men are muddle-headed enough to dread the swamping of the male vote by the majority of women (increased as that has been by the slaughter of this war). No one really thinks that men and women will really vote in hostile sex camps, but the bogey none the less has its terrors. The favorite compromise proposes that while men are enfranchised at twenty-one, women shall come on the register only at twenty-five. It is an irrational compromise enough, for women attain maturity and responsibility rather earlier than men, but it serves to avoid the difficulty of the excess of women in the population. Even this compromise, I am afraid, is still too bold for most of our Tory suffragists, though some of them will accept it. It may rally a majority, but it will not enlist the full suffragist vote in the House. The omens point to delay and a troubled period of prolonged controversy. One factor, however, makes powerfully for an early settlement. The Parliament which is elected after the end of the war will have to disentangle the most intricate industrial problems, and in nearly all of them the rights and status of women wage-earners is vitally involved. That these questions should be settled by a Parliament responsible to men only is an anomaly which thinking men begin to recognize for the thing it is. I am sceptical of the good will of Parliament, when it is left to act without the spur of agitation, sceptical of the lasting effects of our fleeting tribal mood of generosity, sceptical, above all, of the Prime Minister's attitude, defined as it is by a very crooked suffrage record—and yet the hope predominates, that we shall somehow reach a solution in this Parliament.

H. N. Brailsford.

London.

"Joaquin" Miller

When "Joaquin" Miller died two or three years ago, very few people paid any attention to the fact, and some of these were a little amused that the Pacific Coast took his loss so seriously, setting this down to characteristic "native son" enthusiasm. The conventional tactics for the eastern people who did not ignore him altogether was to smite him on the one cheek because he was not of the tribes of New England, and then to demand that he present the other for a smack because he was a wild westerner. Miller was even swept into the engulfing generalization that America has no literature because it lacks the salutary consciousness of a picturesque and primitive past. Yet Miller had really grown up with the country, and in both his career and his work had recorded the stirring melodrama of frontier life.

All through youth and young manhood he lived under conditions which lacked everything that is repressive and sophisticating. "Somehow I couldn't understand or get on with my fellow-man. He seemed always to want to cheat me—to get my labor for nothing. I could appreciate and enter into the heart of an Indian. . . . I think what I most needed in order to understand, get on and not be misunderstood, was a long time at school where my rough points could be ground

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down. . . . You must not have points or anything about you singular or noticeable if you want to get on. . . . . But I was as rough as the lava rocks I roamed over, as broken as the mountains I inhabited." Then, after he had grown up in this way, there came a zone of increasing worldliness, culminating with the fourteen years from 1873 to 1887, when he seemed to have turned his back on his natural surroundings, and when he was enjoying a somewhat adventitious popularity in the East and abroad as an amusingly individual Rocky Mountain poet. For a while, on account of his celebrity as a literary lion, he actually was enabled to " get on " by allowing social capital to be made out of his rough-pointedness; but during the last third of his life he settled back in the mountains with a confirmed distaste for the fruits of civilization, and a renewed and honest delight in the handiwork of God.

He was one of the few genuine American nature-lovers, but his experiences quite surpassed those of Thoreau or Burroughs or Whitman or even Mark Twain in their elemental vigor. He was in six Indian campaigns and three times was dangerously wounded, he suffered snow-blindness in Alaska and desert thirst in Arizona. He knew the terrors of stampede and flood, and of prairie and mountain fire. He knew blood-enmities and friendships unto death, in which these phrases were proved to the uttermost. All these are celebrated so really and vividly in his verse as to make pallid the attempts of Byron and Shelley to give local habitations and names to their imaginings of elemental life.

One consequence of his career is his ability to tell romantic stories so that they are truly exciting, a feat in which the library poet rarely succeeds. Miller presents women of wild and gorgeous beauty, not leaving their beauty in the abstract; he sets them fittingly on mountain-slopes or in forests, or beside the turbulent waters, and makes them so worth adoring that their loss—for they are more often lost than won—is genuine tragedy. Those early heroines of Miller's are worth putting into romantic stories, just as the early poetic loves of Tennyson were each worth at the utmost one graceful little lyric. His heroes are worth while too. Their principles are not expounded, nor the values they were fighting for always made clear; as for the poems there is not time; but once in a while in the prose the primitive law of *noblesse oblige* is laid down. " To the Prince [a gambler] he was nothing much. . . . Why should the Prince take life, or even imperil ours, for his sake? . . . The man needed help. The man was almost helpless. This, perhaps, was the first and strongest reason for his course. But at the bottom of all other reasons for taking care of this man. . . was a little poetical fact not forgotten. This man furnished bread when we were hungry."

Such nature and such life are not of course the poetical material for a contemplative poet. Miller's people are always on the verge of, or in the midst of, or recovering from exciting objective adventure. And, more than that, his nature is not so much a spectacle as a force. Earth, air, fire and water are potentially volcanic, cyclonic, all-consuming and inundating. You know God is behind them because of the power he displays. The keynote of his earliest poems pervades them all, gives the cue to his admirations and antipathies, makes primitive and, in a way, unreal the love story he attempted to set in Venice, and redeems the extraordinary eugenic epithalamium of his old age, Light.

Just how Miller understood his own capacities can be demonstrated by a comparison of The Bareness of New York — often erroneously referred to as a novel—a long poem which appeared as a volume in 1877, with The Sea of Fire, which occupies some eleven pages in his Complete Poetical Works of 1897. The first poem is in two long parts, the first part a sea-island story of love and desertion between Doughal and Adora, done spiritedly after the manner of Scott, and the second—in the tone of Byron—in which she is masquerading as the Baroness du Bois in New York, where " her true strength lay in her splendid scorn of little things," and where Dougal, (who has lost an h in his wanderings) turns up in the last few pages to claim her as Lord Adair. Twenty years later Miller presented what he thought was worth saving of this, by dropping all the Byronic part, and reducing the rest from over 1800 lines to about 800 through squeezing out all the Marmionesque passages. What is left is really Miller.

This was well done. In the sense of wishing to embalm his earlier works in their original versions Miller may be said to have had almost no pride of authorship. But his taste sometimes failed him even when his willingness to use the blue pencil was alive. He ought never to have resorted to humor; what he intended for it seldom amounted to more than rough jocosity. Possibly the nicer discriminations on which humor depends are bred better in town than in country. It thrives in an atmosphere of easy familiarity, but one does not buttonhole the Sierras or pat them on the back. Perhaps again the very largeness of the landscapes by which he was surrounded while he was growing up, led to a magniloquence that made him guilty sometimes of pomposity and sometimes of posing. Both of these artistic peccadilloes are expressions of naïveté. One has to learn to be simple and un-

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affected. It is human nature to be unnatural when others are looking on.

This naturalness Miller more and more acquired. Although he knew and admired the great English romanticists, and although he preserved passages imitative of them in his later editings—a good deal in A Song of the South is pure Coleridge—the quality that pervades his poetry is a simple and abounding eagerness to present life in action. The only author writing to-day who gives one the same sense of man at work in the presence of forces which are all but overwhelming is Joseph Conrad. As Miller aged, he desired more and more to give soul as well as body to his work. Now and again he succeeded in writing something which was more than sheerly objective, in the various bits in which he celebrated the heroism of the pioneer—whether Columbus or the Forty-Niner. And toward the very end of his career he to an extraordinary degree combined the two ambitions of his old age. The one was to present "the vision of worlds beyond," and the other "to leave sound and words to the winds." "American science has swept time and space aside. American science dashes along at fifty, sixty miles an hour; but American literature still lumbers along in the old-fashioned English stage-coach at ten miles an hour; and sometimes with a red-coated outrider blowing a horn. We must leave all this behind us. . . . When the Messiah of American literature comes, he will come singing, so far as may be, in words of a single syllable."

The closing stanza in Sappho and Phaon, the last selection in the Complete Poems, shows how far he was consciously attempting to measure up to his own standard.

> God is not far; man is not far
> From Heaven's porch, where paeans roll.
> Man shall yet speak from star to star
> In silent language of the soul.
> Yon star-strewn skies be but a town,
> With angels passing up and down.
> "I leave my peace with you." Lo! these
> His seven wounds the Pleiades
> Pierce Heaven's porch. But, resting there,
> The new moon rocks the Christ Child in
> Her silver rocking chair.

This is indubitably American. The porch and the rocking chair may tempt the scoffer to ask why Miller did not complete the native picture with a palm-leaf fan and a pitcher of ice-water. If Miller had been asked, he would doubtless have replied that he omitted the latter American accessories only because they did not belong in this particular tableau; that Pullman cars and Niagara Falls and steam radiators and Mount Shasta were all legitimate material for poetry, if only they were apropos. What one should remember—what the reader of "Joaquin" Miller cannot forget—is that his poetry is an eloquent and often beautiful evidence of an aboundingly American youth, manhood and old age.

But people cannot know this unless they read Miller.

PERCY H. BOYNTON.

At the Capitol

IF a person of imagination were asked to specify the two activities with which Congress might least profitably be concerned during an international crisis, he might in good humor suggest underground pneumatic tubes and the personnel of the Board of Managers of the Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers. It is these two matters which have absorbed a good part of the attention of Congress during the past week and excited the most active discussion in both houses since the foreign situation became acute.

The pneumatic tube question came up in the Senate when the annual Post Office Appropriation bill was under consideration. It was not approached without a great deal of manœuvering. At the beginning of the week the Porto Rican Citizenship bill had been the business pending before the Senate. It had already been considerably debated, certain inopportune restrictions as to suffrage had been stricken out, and it seemed that a few more hours' discussion might permit the passage of the first piece of legislation that could even indirectly be regarded as a response to the demands of the international situation. But before anything could be accomplished, the Senate, impatient to accomplish something, voted to drop the Porto Rican matter and take up an entirely different bill, one defining and punishing espionage. That done, and after discussion had proceeded for a time, the Senate decided further to rush matters by dropping the espionage bill and taking up the Post Office Appropriation bill. By this time it was too late in the day to vacillate to still another bill, or to make much headway on the one for which two half-finished measures had been abandoned.

When the bill was brought up on the following day, the Senate, which has lately expressed itself as hostile to "executive usurpation" of legislative power, proceeded to take up the discussion of a purely executive matter—the advisability of continuing pneumatic mail-tube service in the larger cities. On an amendment relative to this service a point of order was immediately raised, and for a day and a half the Senate floundered bitterly in a parliamentary morass. Eventually nothing was done; but it would be discouraging to believe that the Senate could not be better occupied at this time than in quarrelling so protractedly over a point of order on a plainly administrative matter—particularly when the appropriation involved amounted to less than three-tenths of one per cent of the total sum carried in the bill. The aim of all the discussion was, in the words of Senator Vardaman, to put an end to "an unwarranted and indefensible extravagance of something over $600,000 per annum." At the present moment the franking privilege enjoyed by Congressmen is costing the government something over thirty times that sum per annum.

Practically all of the rest of the week in the Senate was devoted to further attempts to sustain and destroy points of order on the same bill. Two days were spent on the

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parliamentary status of an amendment providing one-cent postage for local letters. A point of order was raised, discussed, and sustained. A motion to suspend the rules was proposed, and after much debate voted down. And when the question had apparently been settled, and only a handful of senators were in attendance, the one-cent amendment was again slipped into the bill. This action brought hosts of angry opponents pouring back in from the cloakrooms. Charges of knavery were made. A vote to reconsider was ordered. Indignant debate continued for the rest of the day. And, on the following morning, the amendment was thrown out on the very point of order that had been raised four days before. A week which should have been at least partially devoted to the claims of a foreign crisis was almost wholly consumed in contested points of order, circuitive debate and the juggling of issues that were purely administrative.

Meantime the House found enough in a large number of executive matters to keep it from any opportune action. One large measure which came up early in the week was the annual pension bill. As is the custom in dealing with appropriation measures, one member on each side of the House was selected to "control" the debate. Mr. Rauch, for the Democrats, was of the opinion that an hour ought to be ample time for the consideration of this bill (carrying $160,000,000) and therefore suggested thirty minutes to a side. To this suggestion the Republican leader, Mr. Cannon, agreed. Upon second thought, however, he decided that twenty minutes would be sufficient for his side. Mr. Rauch accepted this reduction, and stated that so far as his side was concerned fifteen minutes would be quite satisfactory. The total time for debate was accordingly set at thirty-five minutes. Mr. Cannon discovered, however, that apparently only one Republican wanted to speak —so that five minutes would be all that his side would require. This proposal Mr. Rauch accepted, and added that further consideration had convinced him that ten minutes would do for the Democrats, and that he would use that himself. So, with fifteen minutes set apart, the $160,000,000 pension bill was brought up. Mr. Oakey, of Connecticut, began the debate for the Republicans. He had, he said, no desire to discuss the pension bill; he simply wanted to reply to a criticism that had been made of an appropriation he had asked for in the Public Buildings bill. The criticism, he said, was unwarranted and unfair. This ended the debate on the Republican side. Mr. Rauch then arose, and, after a brief speech in which his estimate of how much it cost to run an automobile was challenged, closed the debate on the Democratic side. The $160,000,000 bill was then passed by a viva voce vote.

The House was not so summary in dispatching the other non-legislative matters which have occupied much of its attention during the past week. Whereas the $160,000,000 pension bill took the attention of the members away from less public matters for only fifteen minutes, the question of restoring five retired army officers to the active list at $72 a month required an entire day. The issue here seemed an administrative one, properly referable to the War Department; but the House spent a whole day making a law about it. The discussion centered particularly on a Colonel Dickson, who had retired from service in the Panama Canal Zone on account of illness in his family and had subsequently been offered employment by the Remington Arms Company. Did it, or did it not, affect the principle because he had retired on account of illness in his family? Was it, or was it not, rightful to restore a man to active service after he had been offered private employment? "I question," said Mr. Moore of Pennsylvania, who frequently makes a remark of this sort, "I question whether it is ethically wise for a trained officer of the United States to leave the service and go into the employment of a concern that is manufacturing munitions for foreign purposes, which may be used against the United States." After an all-day debate Mr. Moore's ethical suspicions were settled by a vote of 295 to 15, and the House was finally permitted to proceed to the next bill on its calendar. This turned out to be a matter which excited more discussion than anything that has been considered throughout the entire session, and a matter which the House was both ready and entirely fitted to discuss: the appointment of a new member to the Board of Managers of the National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers. Until half past eleven at night this seemingly administrative issue was debated, with charges and countercharges of partisanship. One candidate was a Republican, the other a Democrat; and out of this was born more fervent oratory than recent weeks have seen. On the political complexion of a Board whose president receives a salary of $4,000 a year, seven roll-calls were demanded; on the Naval Appropriation bill, carrying $368,000,000 and providing for the conscription of labor, two were deemed sufficient. Between roll-calls on the Soldiers Home appointment, Representatives Meeker and Burnett kept the House alive to its responsibility by leading choruses.

There could be no better illustration of the interests that have consumed the attention of Congress since it was faced with a foreign situation. Not only has it failed to recognize what may possibly be impending and must surely be anticipated; but under a tension which it has been unable to translate into action it has fallen down in the politically administrative functions which are its stock in trade.

C. M.

CORRESPONDENCE

Wants War Aims Defined

SIR: The New Republic stressed a most important point when it insisted that the vague idealistic aspirations of the American people had at last found adequate and explicit formulation in the speech of the President to the Senate on January 22nd. The President there announced to the world that we were eager to further the working out of some kind of constructive international organization. He declared that such an organization must be based upon a just peace—not a peace in which one set of belligerents imposed their selfish imperialistic will upon their defeated foes, but a peace in which the victors sought through the spirit of reconciliation to provide for the needs of all the nations, enemy as well as ally, in the future interrelations of the states of the world. And he rightly conditioned our entrance into the field of world politics upon the granting of that one kind of peace. To no other kind of peace are we willing to pledge our resources, the prestige of our name, and the lives of our citizens.

It is greatly to be desired that the United States remain neutral in the present war, in order that she may the more freely work for the specified goal. As long as we keep out of war the President is able, with the backing of the nation, to continue his great work—to arouse the hopes of liberals among both sets of the warring powers, to keep open a channel of communication which compels attention, and to guide the thoughts of the common people everywhere along the lines of permanent peace.

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But if we are forced by circumstances beyond our control to enter the war, we must not waver from the attempt to obtain the same goal. We must not grow bitter, we must not cherish revenge. We must plan for a final arrangement which will benefit those who are for a time our enemies, as well as ourselves. And, above all, we must not be drawn carelessly to accept the war aims of those who chance to be our allies. While there is much in the policy of the Entente of which we approve, there is also much of which we do not approve. We approve of the restoration of the conquered territories and of those bits of the territory of the Central Powers which desire to be under the rule of France, Italy and Rumania; of the re-creation of Poland; of the end of the rule of the Turk over oppressed subject-peoples. But we do not approve of the retention of the captured German colonies; of the partition of Persia; of the imperialistic expansion of England and Russia at the expense of weaker states; of any post-bellum economic and commercial war, whereby victory is to be used to build up wealth and prestige for some at the expense of others. Hence it might come about that we should have to draw out of the war and insist on the limitation of the war aims of the Entente to what is fair and permanently wise.

Such must be the program of the United States in this hour of crisis. Whether at peace or at war—though preferably at peace—we must keep before our minds the principle expressed in the President's speech to the Senate.

STERLING POWER LAMPRECHT.

New York City.

For Realism

SIR: The forward reach of your views on foreign relations so generally commands my allegiance that it is peculiarly painful to find you among those who are leading our people down, as it appears to me, the easy slope to the hell of war. It is not only that I believe war in general to be an obsolete method of achieving results, ineffective, costly, unmanageable and essentially wrong, but to enter this war at this time in this way appears to me to be the tragedy of tragedies. I see this country suffering from the illegal brutality of Germany's submarine warfare. But I see no remedy in rival violence, however legal. Entering the war, we throw away like a rag our opportunity to redress the balance of the old world by substituting organization for anarchy. We involve ourselves, for as far ahead as the historical imagination can reach, in the old pernicious system. German politics enter Mexico; our relation to Japan becomes a part of the mosaic of the world kaleidoscope; we feed fat that lusty youngster, American militarism. The only bright spot is that we shall be driven to nationalize railroads, munition making, and much other "profiteering." Entering the war, we lose our freedom of action. A country can go to war when it chooses; it cannot stop when it chooses. As in a strike, the combatants soon find themselves fighting for ends for whose sake they would never have elected to fight in the first place.

This country has the chance to show how modern-minded, how realistic-minded a democracy can be. We have a supreme chance to turn our back on the bloody romanticism of war and develop the same idealism of power used pacifically to great ends. Let us make every practicable concession to the avoiding of occasion of offense, and when offense comes let us, like any decent private person, renounce self-help but not our unremitting protest and our demand for reparation, secured by legal methods at the right time, as in the Alabama claims case. "There can be no reparation for lives taken." True, not even by taking, and losing, an indefinite number of lives. The only reparation for this war is to join, as President Wilson suggested in his great speech of January 22nd (now so long ago) in preventing future wars.

A DEVOTED READER.

Asks for a Separate War

SIR: So far as may be judged by quotations that have reached us, the press of the Allied countries assumes that a break of friendly relations would result automatically in the alignment of the United States with the Entente Powers and our immediate participation in some manner in the present European war. Lord Northcliffe blandly assigns to us the duty of financing the nations now actively opposed to the Central Powers. The press of the United States generally makes the same assumption, that war with Germany means alliance with and aid to her present enemies. The only matter that appears to be in doubt is the form that our contribution to the Allied cause shall take—whether the sending of troops to the Continent, the addition of our naval strength to that of Great Britain and France, gifts of munitions and money, or all of these.

To my mind no such result logically consists with our attitude to the war up to this time. Thus far we have refrained from participation in the war for the reason that it was not our quarrel, or the quarrel did not so nearly concern us as to impel our entry; and this notwithstanding the fact that the sympathies of the great majority of our people have been from the beginning with the Allies. If this sympathy of the majority had been more general or more potent, it would have brought us before this into the war on the side of those we wish to see win it. In that case our participation would have been the deliberate expression of the national will. In fact, the national will has been expressed by our remaining out of the conflict. The cause of our present quarrel with Germany is but incidentally related to the existing war. It is not related at all to the issues of the war. Our quarrel might have arisen just as well at a time when peace prevailed in Europe. Germany, in her conduct of the war, has declined so to limit her submarine operations against her enemies as to avoid the destruction of neutral shipping and neutral lives, and, to our immediate concern, she declines to respect American shipping and American lives. For this we are about to go to war with her, and it affords ample ground for war. It affords no ground whatever for our taking part in the present European war. We should have the same cause for a break with Germany if, in peace manœuvers, she had persisted in such careless handling of her submarines or other instruments of war as to endanger American life and property.

The Allies are engaged in a war which, though it may have been forced upon them originally, they are now waging for the purposes, some of them unselfish, which they have avowed to the world; others selfish, which, though unavowed, are more or less clearly understood. With their avowed purposes—as the redemption and restoration of Belgium and Serbia, the establishment of lasting peace—we are in hearty sympathy: but, as I have said, this sympathy has not availed to bring us into the war. With their unavowed purposes—as the establish-

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ment of a new balance of power in Europe, the conquest and re-allotment of territory, the arrangement of trade alliances—we have nothing to do, and it is very certain we should never go to war for them. Yet these unavowed causes for the continuance of the war not only exist, but operate to hold together the members of the Entente, and it is a part of that compact that no peace shall be made until all are satisfied.

Now if the cause for which the Allies are fighting so appeals to us, on the whole, that we are willing to make that cause our own, by all means let us so declare, and cast our lot with them; but let us not permit ourselves to be dragged into this greatest of wars through the accident that our independent quarrel arises while the war is waging and our adversary happens to be a party to it.

If, as seems likely, Germany shall give us grounds for war with her, we should wage the war independently, and ultimately settle our quarrel with her on its merits, without regard to the pending war, its causes or the purposes of the actors in it.

It is plain that President Wilson has not fallen into the confusion of thought that I attribute to the newspaper press. In his address to the Senate announcing the breach of diplomatic relations with Germany he said that upon wilful action resulting in the further destruction of American shipping or American lives, he would ask of Congress authority to use all means necessary to defend them. Probably it never occurred to him that anyone would take this as presaging a recommendation that we enter the European war and fight till Russia is secure in the possession of Constantinople.

WILLIAM H. FAIN.

Houston, Texas.

Philharmonic Unjustly Criticized

SIR: A word from a layman regarding "expert" Rosenfeld's criticism of Mr. Stransky. Without wishing to act as a defender of the great director of the Philharmonic, for he needs none, I think that when Mr. Rosenfeld wrote that critical article he neglected to keep in mind the most important factor in making programs, viz., "The good old Public." I wonder if Mr. Rosenfeld attended the All-Wagner concert of Sunday, January 28th, and if so whether he didn't get an inkling as to why Mr. Stransky likes to give All-Wagner concerts so often, as well as Liszt and Tschaikowsky concerts. I wonder if he thinks that a concert comprising numbers entirely by Dukas, Debussy, Massenet, etc., would reach the New York public as the All-Wagner concerts do. I wonder if he remembers the time when an All-Wagner concert was a prohibited thing, and I wonder if he does not think that it takes time to get the New York public interested in almost new composers, as it took years before they were far enough in their evolution as music lovers to appreciate Wagner. I might mention that I myself have heard many Philharmonic concerts containing numbers by the modern as well as the classic and romantic composers, and I believe that Mr. Rosenfeld is absolutely in error if he says that Mr. Stransky neglects them, or finds some of them superficial and not worthy of presentation.

As for Mr. Stransky, I believe that the public would disagree entirely with Mr. Rosenfeld when he speaks of the great leader as being prosaic. My testimony, given gladly, is that I think Mr. Stransky is the greatest director in America to-day, and his wonderful body of musicians, thanks to him, the finest orchestra in the land. I always come away from his concerts, feeling that he has more spirit and conducts with truer insight than do any of the other conductors in New York City to-day.

EDW. E. FUCHS.

New York City.

Open Letter to a Congressman

SIR: I enclose a statement from Mr. Pinchot and others endorsing the principle that, except in the case of invasion, the United States should not declare war without a vote of our whole people on the question. I hope that you may use your influence in favor of this course. It seems only right that a step which would probably cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of our young men should only be taken in the light of a clearly expressed determination of the people.

I approve most heartily of the course President Wilson has taken in breaking off diplomatic relations with Germany. The logical sequence seems to me not war, but the following steps:

1. To arm our merchant ships, fore and aft, and, if possible, furnish them with gunners to repel the attacks of submarines.
2. To permit the merchant ships of the Allies to enter our ports when armed in a similar manner.
3. If American ships are sunk or American lives are lost on the high seas, to send our war vessels to Europe to coöperate in policing the ocean against submarines.

None of these steps should be considered as war unless Germany sends submarines or airships to this side of the Atlantic. In case she should do this or should declare war against us, I do not think we should send men to take part in the campaign on land, unless the Entente Allies will agree definitely to accept the principles recently stated by President Wilson, and especially:

1. The right of small nations to independent existence. This implies the restoration of Belgium and Serbia and reparation for the injuries they have suffered.
2. The right of people living in disputed territory to decide for themselves whether they shall form independent states or shall join one or the other of contiguous large nations. This concerns especially northern France, now held by the Germans, Alsace and Lorraine, Russian, German and Austrian Poland and the Trentino, not, however, losing sight of the fact that large nations should have some free outlet to the ocean.
3. The guaranty to all persons of their fundamental human right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, irrespective of race or religion. This concerns Russia as well as Turkey.

If we were to enter the war without a clear definition of these principles, we might, at its close, find ourselves a party to a settlement on the basis of a so-called military necessity instead of on the basis of justice. Only a just settlement can lead to the permanent peace which the whole world desires.

W. A. NOYES.

Correction

[NOTE—We wish to thank Mr. Walter J. Matherly of the University of Minnesota for calling our attention to an error in the editorial, "Issues in the Adamson Law," in the number of January 6th. The case cited as McCullough v. Maryland should be Gibbons v. Ogden.—THE EDITORS.]

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Democratic Control of History

SIR: You published last week an extraordinary advertisement, not extraordinary from the point of view of intellectual honesty, but from its pococurantist treatment of history. I concluded on reading it that I prefer my history straight. The Committee for Democratic Control (control of just what is not clearly indicated; can it be control of the destinies of the American people?) paid its pulverizing respects to Miss Agnes Repplier, Dr. Lyman Abbott, and others. That, doubtless, finishes them. I was surprised to see how gaily and easily it was done. The Higher Patriotism, the Nobler Civilization, that are coming, thanks to the new breed of thinkers, must evidently be founded on human sacrifice, as Robespierre's Reign of Virtue was founded on the guillotine.

Your advertisers, in their excursus into American history, declare that Washington and Adams and the Congress, from 1793 to 1800, insisted upon a policy of neutrality during a great European war, although under intense provocation to depart from it—*"and there was no war."* I can assert with equal emphasis, for example, that Napoleon never took part in any war, if I am allowed to select my dates and to suggest the inference that what happened between those dates continued to happen afterward. Is this advertisement the harbinger of a new school of history about to flourish in our midst? It states: "Neutrality was observed under intense provocation. . . . Finally, for the protection of our interests, Congress declared the policy of Armed Neutrality against France. A larger navy was recruited; reprisals against French aggressions were authorized; our commerce was convoyed; we had naval engagements with French ships; we took prisoners, and they took prisoners. Other incidental hostilities occurred."

To the carnal mind this looks like war, whatever it is called, and we have the authority of Professor John Bassett Moore that a state of limited war existed between this country and France between 1798 and 1800. Some of us think that similar "neutral" conduct would fit the present case very nicely. The next sentence, however, shows us that it was not war: "But the policy of Washington was adhered to by Adams, by the Congress, and by the people of the United States. *We did not go to war with France, because we had no real quarrel with France; and because the people realized that the injuries done to us were not aimed at us but were a part of the terrific struggle of Europe.* Patiently, courageously, Washington and Adams held true patriotism above jingoism. We remained at peace under huge financial loss, under loss of life, under the imputation of cowardice. And history has justified us."

This is such good reading that we want more. But the narrative stops abruptly. No doubt considerations of space necessitated brevity. Yet brevity ought not to be purchased at the expense of the people's enlightenment in a crisis like this. Leaving aside such interesting details as that John Adams took every means to prepare for war, enlarging the navy, enlarging the army and appointing George Washington as its commander, whose career indicated that he was not always pacifistic, but on occasion was quite ready to fight for plain American rights, however their question was raised; also leaving out of account that John Adams was at times bellicose and that he has not, up to now, been generally reputed a bluffer, may it be suggested that perhaps France made concessions to us in 1800 because of these preparations and because of the "incidental hostilities," which were so studiously "neutral" that the face of peace was not thereby marred or distorted? If Germany should now make the concessions we desire and have steadily insisted that she must make, then, it is quite safe to say, there will be no war now.

But there is more meat in this condensed advertisement. "We did not go to war with France, because we had no real quarrel with France; and because the people realized that the injuries done to us were not aimed at us, but were part of the terrific struggle of Europe." Mr. H. G. Wells has somewhere said that when he was a boy at school no English history subsequent to 1832 was taught, and that he got the impression that what had occurred after that date was considered "indelicate." Perhaps some such idea was in the minds of the composers of the document under examination. But at the risk of being indelicate, may I point out that the history of the United States did not stop in 1800, but went right on; also that the terrific struggle of Europe continued, with one slight intermission, until the battle of Waterloo, fifteen years later; and that we did go to war, not with France—notice the unerring adroitness and tact of the Committee in rivetting the attention of the reader upon France—but with England, and we went to war because of injuries done to us which were incidental to the terrific struggle of Europe. I am of the opinion that we considered that those injuries constituted a real quarrel with England and unless my memory is at fault Henry Clay, who was somewhat of an authority on that war, said that we would have been abundantly justified in fighting both England and France, if we had been strong enough. Does history justify Madison?

But I realize that I am playing off the lines. The Committee for Democratic Control has, with admirable self-restraint, fixed the limits of discussion to the years 1793 to 1800. It has also greatly simplified the history, even of those years. And if the Committee is not in control of the discussion, who is?

CHARLES DOWNER HAZEN.

New York City.

Professorial Amenities

SIR: It is instructive to compare the current opinions of two distinguished American citizens of Anglo-Scotch descent, Professors Lanman and Shepherd. The former, who heads the Oriental department at Harvard, states in the Evening Post that Germany has a gagged press and no free speech. He hears already the "volcano rumblings of the brewing revolution which will down forever supreme war lords and the whole gang that hangs on to them."

The head of the department of history at Columbia University, on the other hand, recognizes in Lloyd George's recent speech the economic and social Germanization of Great Britain. According to the Times, my learned friend even anticipates a thoroughgoing democratization of England on German lines as soon as the war is over.

May I take this opportunity, and add my feeble voice to the weighty plea just made by Sir Frederick G. Kenyon? That great English "superpatriot" who so ably directs the British Museum confidently hopes that the initiated peace movement may speedily restore the shattered fabric of international scholarship, and revindicate the cosmopolitan character of civilization and culture which is sacred to men of science and learning throughout the world.

ERNEST P. HORRWITZ.

New York City.

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After the Play

ONE of the prevalent marvels of literature and drama is the insinuating influence of the late Deadwood Dick. I never saw a German professor in my life, and the German professor of comic papers may be as rare as the hippogriff, but if there really exists one of those relentless, microscopic scrutineers I should like to see him sift the masterpieces of contemporary Britain and show how and when real American literature began to eat its way into the soul of the English people. It is one of the kind affectations of criticism to say that Bernard Shaw wrote Blanco Posnet under the influence of Bret Harte. I should always have believed this fable if Messrs. Galsworthy and Chesterton had not followed on the heels of Bernard Shaw, and shown themselves to be gloriously reeling under the same literary influence. Waal, stranger, I reckon it knocks the 'tarnal tar out of your gizzard to see such an aggregation of consummate intellects swayed by the same mighty power. I guess it kind of upsets your calculations, don't it? Yes, I opine it do. Such all-fired brilliancy as these eminent men usually superimpose on ordinary occurrences scarcely prepares a fellar for the plain, old-fashioned homey truth. Say, pardner, it is one colossal and gigantic tribute to the triumph of memory over observation to see the childhood impressions of the penny-dreadful reasserting themselves amid the coruscations of this stupendous trio. Nevertheless, friend, there can be no legitimate doubt or justifiable difference of opinion on this important issue. Yes, brother, Gilbert, Bernard and John have never perfectly recovered from the first overpowering effect of the works of N. Carter, Detective, and the Adventures of Deadwood Dick.

One may not believe that "opine" and "tarnation" are still supposed to be characteristically Americanese, especially of persons who have mingled in the sophisticated East. Yet it is in G. K. Chesterton's fantastic comedy Magic and in John Galsworthy's new playlet The Little Man, admirably produced by Mrs. Emilie Hapgood last week in New York, that one detects this reminiscential style of portraying the American. Life is so busy imitating art, of course, that it is quite understandable how these Englishmen could go desperately wrong. It is hard that they should be expected to see that the flagrancies of America, as they observe them, are probably a reflex to their own boyhood American literature, not its corroboration. One has only to suggest Deadwood Billy Sunday or Deadwood Teddy Roosevelt to see how the reflex to boyhood literature is in fact inextricably tangled up with perfectly natural and characteristic national impulses. Why did Mr. Roosevelt want to be a cowboy and with the cowboys stand? Because he read it in a story. Why does Billy Sunday believe that life is a purple tornado punctuated by train-wrecks, gunplay and chromos of little Eva crossing the ice? Because he took his Deadwood Dick before he had eaten anything solid. These are the things about America that great men like Shaw, Chesterton and Galsworthy are too busy being amused to find out.

The American traveler is almost the entire entertainment in Mr. Galsworthy's "whimsey." The "little man" is a meek person who enters an Austrian railway station in the midst of the superman talk of a German, the bombast of the American, the snobbish silence of an Englishman and his wife—and turns out to be the only person who is disinterested or sympathetic enough to notice a forlorn woman with a baby. It is true that his solicitude creates an enormous amount of trouble. He is so busy looking after the infant that he takes it aboard the train in his arms and leaves the frantic mother behind. No one blames him for this, however, not even Mr. Galsworthy. And it gives Mr. O. P. Heggie a chance to act as a male Maude Adams and the dramatist an excuse for satirizing the humanitarian guff of the American. If the American's idiom were not so palpably absurd, there would be a great deal of force in the satire. One caught reverberations of Gerald Stanley Lee and Arthur Brisbane and William Jennings Bryan and Herbert Kaufman and Frank Crane in the ugly jargon of this unctuous Philistine. It is an artistic catastrophe that Mr. Galsworthy's verbal ear was so much less sensitive than his spiritual.

The sharpest criticism that one can make of G. K. Chesterton's Magic is that one's judgment of it depends on one's religion. It is the kind of play that one rejoices to have seen because Chesterton is one of the most engaging living writers, and not to have witnessed his "only play" would be worse than being away when the giraffe comes to town. But apart from the gratification of one's curiosity and a satisfaction with much of its incident, one goes away from Magic with a feeling that Chesterton has tied a noose in a moonbeam and been surprised that he did not capture your emotion. The central figure in Magic is a conjuror, acted most prepossessingly by Mr. Heggie. This conjurer is to perform for charity at the home of a duke, but before he exhibits professionally the duke's niece finds him wandering in a misty twilight in a ducal plantation of thin young trees, and there he exhibits mysteriously and unprofessionally, a performance for love. The niece is Irish, G. K. Chesterton's delightful idea of Irish, and she has a cub of a brother just returned from America. The chief scene of the play is a quarrel between this bouncing and insulting youth and the inoffensive conjurer, in which the conjurer saves his face and unbalances the blasphemous boy by accomplishing a miracle. After the miracle the devils are exceedingly active in the duke's drawing-room. There is an unbelieving doctor there, and a tepid clergyman, and the duke himself, an extremely amusing specimen of facing-both-ways. Until the devils are banished, the modernists are horribly disturbed. They suffer a kind of spiritual channel-crossing. But once the evil spirits vanish they become quite chipper again, and patronize the conjurer's miracle and talk "explanations" in the way that upsets Mr. Chesterton. The only person who is nice to the conjurer is the Irish niece. She reveals that she had double-sight in the Celtic twilight, she saw the man as well as the magician, and she is perfectly willing to come in out of the mist. It is what is known as a happy ending, though the poor conjurer is to have the duke as his pseudo-uncle and the hysterical Irish-American as his brother-in-law.

If the only alternative to specious "explanations" were a feather-bed relaxation in credulity, Magic would have a climax effective enough to take all the audience into camp. It is easy enough for the conjurer to win as against the boy who tries to draw a gun, the doctor, the parson and the duke. The trouble, dramatically, is one's inability to share Mr. Chesterton's gratification over the débâcle of the powers of darkness. The only person in the play who understood fairies is the Irish niece who manœuvered them in the twilight. The miracle-worker did not understand them at all, and I am sure that a competent psychiatrist could concede him three fairies at the beginning and turn out a tough-minded version of magic that would be better than the mystic one in the end.

F. H.

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Books and Things

IT would pay Aristotle, if he were alive and could still find time for letters, to read the preface to Lewis Seymour and Some Women, which is the story of A Modern Lover, George Moore's first book, retold by the George Moore of to-day. The passage that would interest Aristotle is this: "Style and presentation of character and a fine taste in the selection of words are secondary gifts; and secondary gifts may be acquired, may be developed at least, but the story-teller comes into the world fully equipped almost from the first, finding stories wherever he goes as instinctively as the reaper in the cornfield discovers melodies that the professor of counterpoint and harmony strives after vainly in his university." In the Poetics — Butcher's translation — Aristotle says: "Again, if you string together a set of speeches expressive of character, and well finished in point of diction and thought, you will not produce the essential tragic effect nearly so well as with a play which, however deficient in these respects, yet has a plot and artistically constructed incidents. . . . A further proof is, that novices in the art attain to finish of diction and precision of portraiture before they can construct the plot." Aristotle, living in a world where nearly all writers used the same stories thought the proper telling of a story the hardest thing to learn. George Moore does not deny this. He merely says a man is born either with the gift of making up stories or without it. The Greek and the Irishman both say that plot is more important than character or words.

To-day we all admit that George Moore and Aristotle, if you try to apply their opinion to contemporary fiction, are clearly wrong. It is in the nature of things that nothing so absolute can be true. Even if we concede, just for the argument's sake, that it is harder to invent or to tell a story than to "create" a character, we are still free to maintain, in the case of a novelist whose aim is to make us say, "Yes, this is like life," that a plot he thinks good, whether he found it or invented it, is likely to get between him and his object. In this same preface Mr. Moore says of Stevenson's Amateur Emigrant that all its "admirable qualities would have been destroyed by one drop of story." Of course, and a drop of story, in this sense, would have been as fatal to Boswell or Pepys. Suppose you and I live three hundred and sixty-five days a year for sixty-five years. In the course of our lives we meet many characters, machine-made and hand-made—perhaps you are yourself a hand-made character. We also, at long intervals, for a few hours or a few months at a time, are the heroes or heroines of a short story or two. But nothing is more absent from our lives as wholes than plot-interest. When we come to die we shall find, if we have time to look about us, that we have not lived plots and that we have lived biographies. That is why modern novelists, who know this quite as well as we do, so often fight shy of plots. Seeking an effect of lifelikeness, they are naturally afraid of symmetry, of obvious calculation, of any sign of the novelist's obtrusive will.

Mr. George Moore, by the way, thinks that Stevenson was not a born story-teller, that he "strove after stories, suspecting all the while that his were not instinctive melodies. . . . The good fairy came in at the window with her presents, and as soon as she had laid them by the child's cradle she departed; but no sooner was she out of sight than the wicked fairy descended by the chimney, and, standing by the cradle, said: 'I cannot take away the gifts that the good fairy has given thee, but I can blight them forever in thine eyes. Thou shalt never write a story that does not seem tushery to thee.'" Years ago, before Stevenson had told us how some of his stories first occurred to him, Marcel Schwob acutely guessed that Stevenson often began with a vision, which came unsought and fascinated him, and that he afterward invented deliberately a story to go with it. One of Schwob's examples was The Sire de Malétroit's Door—first the vision, the wind and darkness in the steep streets of the mediæval town, the door which yields so surprisingly to the young man seeking safety; then the invention, the laborious attempt to find a story which should explain that mysterious door. Another example was The Pavilion on the Links, where the inferiority of the story invented to the place seen was in Schwob's opinion, to the best of my recollection, less marked. Schwob did not generalize from these examples. He did not attach much importance to them, admitting that sometimes the story was better than the vision.

From the public's point of view I don't suppose it matters much how a story-teller goes to work. One of Mr. Moore's favorite novelists, Turgéniev, thought of his characters first, studying them and imagining them and writing out short biographies of them, and coming slowly to his story, as to the events most likely to befall such men and women. Plutarch, Holinshed, other men's plays, other men's stories—that was Shakespeare's way. Sardou's was different. He began by asking himself a question, as for example, What is the greatest sacrifice a man can make for his country? When he had found the answer—forgiveness of wife's lover—he asked himself other questions, and the result was Patrie. From the preface to the Apostle we learn that The Brook Kerith was conceived in the National Library at Dublin. "'Why, then,' I asked myself as I stood before John Eglinton, 'should not Christ have returned to his monastery, having been cured of his wounds at the house of Joseph of Arimathea? Why should not Paul, after a day's preaching amid the Palestinian hills, have knocked at the door of that monastery? What a wonderful meeting that would have been!'" The genesis of Lewis Seymour and Some Women is described in the preface. Mr. Moore had given up as hopeless the task of revising A Modern Lover. "But we are so constituted that we cannot remain permanently unhappy. And one day, while bathing, it occurred to me suddenly that though it was impossible to revise the text of A Modern Lover, a new novel might be written round an anecdote which appealed to my æsthetic sense to-day as much as it did when I first discovered it thirty-five years ago."

Once they have started, all novelists proceed, I suppose, after the same fashion, by waking up and finding that material has come to them, unaccountably, in the night; by sitting down at their desks and discovering that carefully planned chapters refuse to exist except in the form of plans; by pottering and hallucination, by dreaming and racking their brains; by a compromise between filling out the design of the novel foreseen and getting into their picture the matter that comes of itself. All novelists, I mean, except the happy few whose later impulses give nothing but help to the initial impulse, and the unhappy many who go ahead conscientiously, sticking to a plan fixed in advance, and never tempted to alter it by any pressure of new and unsought chapters or pages. P. L.

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The Fiction Factory

The Contemporary Short Story, a Practical Manual, by Harry T. Baker, M.A. Boston: D. C. Heath & Co.

ONE of the great achievements of American business life is the art of window-dressing, and that salubrious art has steadily crept from business into politics, education and literature, until popular ideas on these subjects are honeycombed with prevailing romance. To call a book on the short story "practical," for example, makes Mr. Harry T. Baker confident that he meets the requirements of his age and escapes any charge of being pedantic or remote or academic. "Practical" in this connection, however, has only one meaning, as Thorstein Veblen indicated a number of years ago. "'Practical' means useful for private gain." What Mr. Baker's subtitle really says is: You think I am a professor. I am as close to the ground as Nicholas Murray Butler. I possess the common sense that is first in peace, first in war, first in the hearts of my countrymen. You think that an educator can only discuss the short story in an arid "cultural" fashion. I may be merely an instructor in English in the University of Illinois, but you do not realize that I previously worked for William Randolph Hearst as a "special reader of fiction manuscripts." I can show you how to write for money, how to make money out of fiction. I have taken over from business the doctrine of efficiency and success, and its practical application to the literary art is my specialty. I have not attempted to set up an impracticable ideal on the one hand, nor to concede too much to the lower range of popular taste on the other. Walk up, gentlemen, and see me do it. The short story so prepared that editors will eat it out of your hand!

The method employed by Mr. Harry T. Baker is a perfectly simple one. It consists essentially in first of all placating American idealism by saying what a vulgar thing the commercial atmosphere of America is. Our editors are business men rather than literary men. They come to the magazines out of the newspaper field. Our magazine owners are also business men. Most of them are honest business men, but they are indifferent or hostile to literary art. They will not listen with patience to anything that is inconsistent with large profits. "Our glorification of the 'practical' and contempt for the beautiful is all too outrageously prevalent." Having dropped a tear or two over these regrettable circumstances, Mr. Baker casts an even sadder glance at the American populace. The taste of the populace is bad. And the worst of it is the subservience of the editors. A fiction magazine lives to please and must please in order to live. The editor merely feels the public pulse. "The old-style millionaire's attitude, 'the public be damned,' has nothing in common with the attitude of a successful editor. He must be a barometer of the changes in public taste and must alter his plans at the first symptoms of these changes." Mr. Baker leaves nothing unsaid that the impractical person might wish him to say. So far as idealism goes, he is correct.

But this is not the way to put over a "practical" manual. It is all very well to say that "honesty and sincerity are at the bottom of all good literary work," and that in men like R. W. Chambers "there is often a lack of elevation, of nobility. Their dialogue, like their sentiment and their moral tone, is at a low level." Any correct professor could say things like this. Any correct professor could say: "Good writers should not allow themselves to be bullied by editors and publishers. The fact is that we are in danger of developing in America a race of literary invertebrates." Quite admirable, of course, but how can this be reconciled with a practical manual, with brisk and businesslike editors in mind?

Mr. Harry T. Baker has no real trouble. He is completely willing to criticize the popular editor, the public and the successful writer so long as it is a question of theory, but the moment he comes down to conduct he shows that honesty and sincerity are plasticine in his hands, and he can give them any shape he desires. Of course he does not do this deliberately. He has no such Machiavellian intelligence. He is not a double-dealer by disgustingly malign intention. He is merely a double-dealer by disgusting business instinct. Of exacting taste he has not a particle. There is not, in a literary sense, an honest hair in his head. But his dishonesty and insincerity are not calculated. They are business by-products.

His method is this: after upholding the banner of the ideal and preaching the difficulties of it, he turns around to show that "business is not always incompatible with art." You may argue that "the average person, at whom periodicals with large circulations are aimed, dislikes with a purely childish dislike any unhappy ending, however logical and inevitable. He prefers to have life falsified for his delectation; and, being the buyer, he gets his wish. Compare the department store motto: 'The customer is always right.'" With this Mr. Baker superficially agrees. When he comes to the Saturday Evening Post, however, he mulls his criticism. "Its tone, from cover to cover, is virile—though plenty of women find it interesting. Its editorial page, owing to the necessity of placating its many subscribers, is less vigorous and provocative than that of Collier's, its rival in the five-cent field; but it is amusing to discover how many New York editors call for stories 'of the Saturday Evening Post type.' It is the sincerest flattery that this periodical could receive. . . . In no other American periodical, at any rate, is there so much personality, so much unity of feeling and tone, as in the Post. And this is due to the fact that it represents to a surprising degree the personal ideas and standpoints of its editor. What the public want, however, is generally what Mr. Lorimer wants and accepts; for he is a typical American business man of the desirable kind. . . . Moral for magazine-owners: Choose a strong editor and give him a free hand."

A man like Thorstein Veblen knows what a "strong" editor really means. "The first duty of an editor is to gauge the sentiments of his readers, and then tell them what they like to believe." Mr. Harry Baker's glozing process slightly disguises this fact. He does not reveal his powerful qualifications as a "practical" educator, however, until one assembles his obiter dicta on the less popular writers. "It is, after all, a legitimate demand of readers that they be given entertainment, and, if possible, inspiration. Writers like Thomas Hardy, who have a dreary, hopeless outlook on life, are not welcomed in popular magazines, however deft their literary art. The sex interest of Tess of the D'Urbervilles, however, would probably have made it desirable as a serial for some erotic periodical; had it been written in 1916 instead of in 1891." That is amusing from a Hearst graduate, but no more so than this: "In Ibsen and his school—which has penetrated the short story as well as the drama—there is nothing to relieve the pessimism. A defiant rebel against society, Ibsen busied himself with drawing indictment after indictment against human life. But this is not the

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way to build up a magazine circulation of half a million or a million copies. The spirit of any successful periodical will be found to be optimistic." "Unlovable authors like Walter Savage Landor are unpopular because they did not care enough for their fellow men."

After such dissertation one is in a position to enjoy the complete irony of this Harry Bakerism: "Honesty and sincerity are at the bottom of all good literary work. Writers of short stories who are ambitious to get into good magazines should remember, further, that certain subjects are in themselves undesirable, regardless of the merits of the story. Very few periodicals admit anything sordid or depressing." Be honest and sincere; at the same time, be desirable and popular.

Mr. Baker and Mr. Veblen are in substantial agreement as to the rules for magazine popularity. "What is encouraged and cultivated," says Mr. Veblen, "is adroitness of style and a piquant presentation of commonplaces. Harmlessness, not to say pointlessness, and an edifying, gossipy optimism are the substantial characteristics, which persist through all the ephemeral mutations of style, manner, and subject-matter. Business enterprise, therefore, it is believed, gives a salutary bent to periodical literature. It conduces mildly to the maintenance of archaic ideals and philistine affections, and inculcates the crasser forms of patriotic, sportsmanlike and spendthrift aspirations." These things, without seeing the implications, Mr. Baker also believes. He only differs from Mr. Veblen in wishing to teach young America how to succeed, at the expense of Conrad and Kipling and Maupassant and Poe and Stevenson, in writing bunk for money.

F. H.

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FIFTH AVENUE AND 37TH STREET
NEW YORK

Elihu Root on Government

Addresses on Government and Citizenship, by Elihu Root. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. $2.00.

CONCERNING Mr. Root there are current two distinct legends. One paints him as "undoubtedly the ablest man in the United States," the greatest lawyer and statesman of our time. The other pictures him as the typical corporation lawyer, the defender of Tweed and the legal servant of the traction and whiskey trusts. Few of us really know what truth underlies these legends. Mr. Root organized our Philippine government and reorganized our army. How many of us really know enough of the facts in each case to judge what he did or should have done? How many of those who denounce him as a tool of Ryan in the traction scandals know exactly what was Root's specific part in those transactions? But we dare not admit our ignorance when all our neighbors speak with the undisturbed confidence that comes from not knowing anything to the contrary. Hence we clutch at the first available straw of evidence that comes our way; and rumor, hearsay, or chance impression becomes the basis of our emphatic belief. The publication of this volume, however, puts us all in the position of at least being able to examine the quality of Mr. Root's mind.

To assert, for instance, that Mr. Root is entirely devoid of originality or creative insight in the subjects treated in this volume may shock and call to arms Mr. Root's too ardent admirers; but they will find it difficult to point out a single original idea in the 542 pages before us. So, also, will the reading of this volume discomfort those who confidently assert that Root is nothing but a shrewd lawyer, using legal and technical subtleties to bolster up the interests of the propertied classes. These addresses do not show him to be of the common brood of hirelings who bay at the rising tide of democracy. There is in his utterance a rugged rustic simplicity and strength that comes only of a thorough, naïve acceptance of a very simple doctrine. Indeed, in spite of obvious differences of temperament, experience and sympathy, Mr. Root appears here essentially like Mr. Bryan, a preacher of evangelical faith in the traditional American individualism. To Mr. Root, it is true, the gospel appears in its harder form, as an eternal law condemning in advance all varieties of western insurgency; whereas to Mr. Bryan the gospel is essentially a human liberation, and specifically a liberation from the sway of the Wall Street which employs men like Mr. Root. But it would be a radical error to overlook the fact that Mr. Root's thought starts not from his experience in Wall Street, but from his naïve faith in the rural Puritanic individualism which he imbibed in his native Oneida.

The outlines of this faith are as simple as they are familiar. It begins with the Calvinistic belief in the total depravity of human nature in politics, especially when it comes to ordinary legislation. "Our natures are weak, prone to error, subject to fall into temptation, to be led astray by impulse" (page 406). On the other hand, there is an abounding grace in man's unrestricted individual economic activity. All that is valuable in civilization is simply "the sum total of intelligent selfishness in a vast number of individuals, each working for his own support, his own gain, his own betterment" (page 85). To protect each individual in this right to pursue his happiness in his

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own way, constitutional restraints must be imposed on the majority and especially on the legislature. These restraints can be enforced only by an independent judiciary, which alone is always free from human passion and interests, and decides always in accordance with the eternal principles of justice and reason.

The professed theorist or closet philosopher is seldom a doctrinaire. He knows too well the difficulty of making theories fit the obstinate facts, and he is apt to have a very keen sense of his practical inexperience. The successful man of affairs, whose mind is not trained to question first principles, is not conscious of such limitations, and when he is committed to a theory the poor facts of life have no chance at all. Thus Mr. Root is so committed to the old doctrinaire individualism that he can see nothing in the present war but the fight of the individual against the claims of the state (page 514), and he does not stop to ask whether it is Germany or Russia that is fighting for the view that the rights of the individual are superior to those of the state. So, also, to Mr. Root the American constitutional system is not simply the historic result of colonial experience, to be justified only so long as it works well. It is the embodiment of absolute eternal laws of justice and liberty (pages 261, 500), valid for all generations to come (pages 116, 117), and no experience to come will justify any amendment of it (page 273). Not to mar the lyric intensity of this refrain, the editors have wisely omitted all reference to Mr. Root's activity on behalf of the Income Tax amendment.

Like other preachers, Mr. Root does not prove or justify his "principles." He treats them as if they were universally admitted. The only doubters he recognizes are the vague tribe of socialists (whose writings have never contaminated his mind), immigrants, who are sure to be converted sooner or later, and certain perverse professors in our colleges and law schools, "half-baked and conceited theorists." Despite, however, this display of temper, pardonable in an old man, we may be sure that Mr. Root has too much of the American spirit to adopt the attitude of Torquemada to students of history who find his historical learning obsolete, or to students of philosophy and political science who find that his method of elevating all his assumptions into "eternal principles" has become hopelessly antiquated since modern experimental science has replaced the method of scholasticism.

Obsolete learning about Anglo-Saxons, Witenagemot, and Magna Charta may be pardonable in a man of affairs, and even total ignorance when he speaks of Roman law. But why should an intelligent man to-day speak of the Fathers of 1789 in the manner of the Chinese, as if they were semi-divine beings not subject to the limitations of human nature? Surely the world has learned a great deal since 1789. The writers of the Federalist could surely have improved their knowledge of Greek federalism if they had read Polybios instead of Mably. Mr. Root also confuses the restraints on popular will embodied in the Constitution with the doctrine of popular sovereignty embodied in the Declaration of Independence. Conservative historians like McMaster, Ford or President Wilson have repeatedly pointed out that the Federal Convention was organized not by democrats like Jefferson, Patrick Henry or Samuel Adams, who were prominent in the Revolutionary movement, but by the commercial and propertied classes, who were frightened at the excesses of the popular state governments. The Federal Convention, however, agreed not on eternal principles, but on practical compromises which did not completely satisfy any party. These compromises worked until the slavery issue became so acute that men refused to compromise any longer, and the constitutional system broke down. The Dred Scott decision had to be recalled by a frightful civil war.

It is not creditable to Mr. Root's knowledge of Europe that he should repeat the vain boast that they all envy us our constitutional system. Neither the democracy of France nor that of England would for a moment tolerate giving the final word in matters of railroad or labor legislation to a small number of elderly judges. The Swiss are surely a liberty-loving people and they have a federal form of government, but they have explicitly prohibited their courts from declaring acts of their federal legislature unconstitutional.

Lawyers get so in the habit of relying on legal fiction that they become incapable of distinguishing fact from fiction. Thus to Mr. Root constitutions "are made impersonally, abstractly, dispassionately, impartially, as the people's expression of what they believe to be right and necessary, etc." (page 102). But in point of fact constitutions are made by conventions of delegates in which lawyers of a certain type frequently predominate. That they are not always free from partisan bias may be seen in the way in which they often gerrymander the state in the interests of their own political party. Mr. Root himself admits that the New York state constitution was a complicated affair which took the convention five months to work out, and that ordinary business men, farmers, or workingmen could not be expected to determine what it meant. Indeed, if there is one thing certain about the American legal system it is that not even trained lawyers know how, in a new case, the courts will interpret "due process" or "equal protection of laws."

Mr. Root, one of the authors of the New York state constitution of 1894, has not deleted in this volume his wrong guess as to how the state courts would rule on the matter of workingmen's compensation. Courts, as Mr. Root admits, "are certain to vary, and differ and conflict in their decisions" (page 177), so that the plain, unmistakable fact is that government by bills of rights has produced not a reign of law, but of the higher lawlessness, in which judges have through ignorance, apathy, or class bias, frequently defeated the just demands of the community.

Both the political opponents and the friends of Mr. Root are united in referring to him as "a cold, clear intellect." The contents of this volume certainly do not bear out this legend. The clear mind does not abound in glaring contradictions. Thus, when Mr. Root argues against the public dissatisfaction with the quality of judicial decisions, he says "it is not within the judge's function or within his power to enlarge or improve or change the law." But when he talks to lawyers of what is actually going on, he points out how the courts are now *making* administrative law and retiring the constitutional doctrine against the delegation of legislative power. Again, the broad general principles which Mr. Root invokes so often turn out to be most vague when we press for their precise meaning. It is impossible, for instance, to obtain any clear idea of what Mr. Root means by "representative government," about which he always speaks with rapture. All that we can gather is that he believes that *some* of our rulers should be *elected* by a limited body of voters, but that after election they should represent their own judgment. It seems that "the people" have "unerring insight" in their judgment of men (p. 43), but cannot be trusted on important measures. The truth indeed is

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that all these attempts to settle complicated problems by direct appeal to broad principles are transactions with blank checks. To say that "it is injurious for the government to attempt too much" sounds sententious, but it is just as true that it is injurious for the government to attempt too little. Mr. Root himself when he is not arguing for laissez-faire amply indicates the danger of the latter course in an age when men cannot protect themselves against many dangers except through their government. Indeed, when Mr. Root is not thinking of his fundamental theory he states rather clearly what all intelligent men now recognize as the shortcomings of government by law and lawyers (see, e.g., page 524). But his adherence to his theory and his devotion to the established order are too passionate to allow mere facts to influence him.

The passionate intensity of Mr. Root's utterance convinces the reader that to his friends Mr. Root must be a model of personal loyalty. For forty years he unprotestingly watched his native state ruled by an "invisible government no more representative than that of Venezuela." Nay, he was himself a part and defender of this government which he knew to be unconstitutional and wrong. His own naïve explanation is embodied in the following: "I don't criticize the men of the invisible government. How can I? I have known them all and among them have been some of my dearest friends." A cold, clear intellect would surely have distinguished between loyalty to friends and loyalty to the state or civic righteousness. Perhaps the habits of the paid advocate used to defending questionable interests in accordance with the rules of the legal game cannot but blunt a man's moral initiative. But whether Mr. Root did or did not originally possess the capacity for moral initiative, it is clear that, like his friend Lodge, he has never had the illuminating experience of life which makes a man become a Pilgrim himself instead of remaining proud of the fact that his ancestors were.

One whose gaze is directed to the future will look in vain in this volume for any light on the vexed problems of industrial and social reform or of racial and religious adjustment. Such a reader will be impressed with the pathos of so much native energy and moral zeal wasted in trying to prevent the inevitable and crushing hand of time from falling on ancient beliefs. Nor is there lacking a certain nobility in this defense of a cause intellectually as antiquated as was chivalry in the days of Don Quixote.

As I was reading Mr. Root's elaborate but futile speech against the popular election of United States senators, I must have dozed off. For I thought I was on Olympus where Rabelais, Cervantes, Molière, Heine, Dickens, Mark Twain, Mr. Dooley and Shaw were drinking ambrosial beer and filling the air with thunderous laughter. Soon Mr. Root came along, his body erect, his head thrown back, reciting a speech in which could be heard "eternal principles," "popular passion," "constitutional restraints," and "division of power." He walked by, not paying the least attention to the jolly company. Some one, it sounded like Mark Twain, called after him: "I'd change that song, Elihu! It's getting stale and it doesn't work any more. Why don't you learn the new songs? Throw in something about evolutionary philosophy, social psychology, and social uplift and progress. Men of wealth and power can play the new tunes as well as the old, and have the additional comfort of not being laughed at by their own young fellows who have had a little more schooling." But Mr. Root walked on unperturbed.

MORRIS R. COHEN.

Dr. Faustus Hires An Assistant

FAUSTUS (*reformed*) A YOUNG DOCTOR

FAUSTUS. And so you call yourself a doctor. Do you realize that the first definition of a doctor is "a learned man"?

DOCTOR. I hold three diplomas, Sir, the last from a medical school.

FAUSTUS. So you are trained in modern medicine. Tell me, then, how is your science different from that of the ancient Egyptians?

DOCTOR. I do not know about the Egyptians, but——

FAUSTUS. Hold. The Egyptians had methods of surgery and sanitation in 1550 B.C. that we cannot now afford to overlook. Can you tell me how our hospitals have improved upon the Asclepieia? *Pause*——. So you do not know Greek medicine either? What of Persian, Babylonian, Roman? Have you never heard of the Methodists, of Claudius Galen, of what your profession owes to the Arabian caliphs, of Henri de Mondeville, of Frère Côme?

DOCTOR. Our course had nothing of them, Sir; we learned the *practice* of medicine. We have no need——

FAUSTUS. Alas, you are a victim of this age. Once every physician was a man of learning. But now—why, my man Wagner knows more of the history of medicine than the doctors themselves. Literary browsing cannot but profit you, and where can you begin more profitably than with the history of your profession?

DOCTOR. But is the history anywhere assembled?

FAUSTUS. For once you are in luck. Only yesterday there issued from the press the first book[1] in which you could find the answers to my questions pleasantly set forth. I read it last night (and I own this may in part account for my glibness). I commend it to you. Read it in the evening—you need not fear falling asleep; it reads well, in fact it will hold *lay* readers.

DOCTOR. I thank you, Sir.

FAUSTUS. You are indeed welcome. Since you seem interested in books, hear what Richard Cabot says of one on diet:[2] (*reading*) "*All that is really known about Diet can be contained in a very small book, and one of the most encouraging signs of the times is that books on Diet are getting smaller. The man who probably knows as much about it as anybody in the United States is Dr. Graham Lusk. He has published a book of fifty-one pages, which contain almost all the known wisdom on the subject—a most refreshing contrast to the Old Wives' Tales that are so numerous and so dull in long books on this subject.*"

DOCTOR. And about that position in your laboratory, Sir?

FAUSTUS. Come back when you have read these books. We shall then have more in common and I can judge whether we shall be suited.

[1] THE GROWTH OF MEDICINE, from the Earliest Times to about 1800. By Albert H. Buck, M.D., Editor of "Reference Handbook of the Medical Sciences." 582 pages. 28 illustrations. $5.00 net, postpaid.

[2] THE FUNDAMENTAL BASIS OF NUTRITION. By Graham Lusk, Ph.D. (Fourth printing.) 50 cents net, postpaid.

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Sectional

The Little Book of American Poets, compiled by Jessie Rittenhouse. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. $1.25.

THE Little Book of American Poets, a companion volume to The Little Book of Modern Verse, is designed as the compiler, Miss Rittenhouse, tells us, to "cover the nineteenth century as the latter covers the twentieth"; to form, with this collection, "a compendium of American poetry"; and to "present in compact form some of the finer and more enduring things in our poetic literature."

Sectional in range, the book is in no respect national and should not have been called American. It omits all Stephen Foster's thrilling southern songs that have expressed so many of our ways to the world. It leaves out Joel Chandler Harris's Negro melodies; and the ineffable humility and everlasting mercy of De Massa ob de Sheep-Fol. You do not hear the lovely voice of Fanny Kemble's mocking-bird calling from its pages

> "What didst thou sing, O thou jubilant soul?
> Ever-fresh flowers and never-leafless trees."

The music of "Ironquill" of the Kansas bluffs and prairies will not here tell you how

> "There is a clouded city, gone to rest
> Beyond the crest
> Where cordilleras mar the mystic West——"

Nor would you ever have an inkling from this book that "covers the nineteenth century" that Bret Harte's poem The Drum was the means of summoning the entire state of California into the Civil War: nor catch one beat of a thrumming that sounded in the souls of thousands of Americans on the dramatic eve of that wild holocaust.

What does the poetry of the nineteenth century in our country mean to us? Perhaps my sense of it may be very personal and arbitrary. It is, however, my only means of judgment.

Down from our grandfather's time and through our father's we hear, I think, first—I mean historically first—the voice of absolute faith, the voice that sang Rocked in the Cradle of the Deep with a fathomless passion of religious love and confidence. It rises for us still at vespers, in the quiet and sincere sympathy of Doane's

> "Softly now the light of day
> Fades upon my sight away——"

and chords the intensities of Palmer's

> "As thou hast died for me
> Oh may my love for thee
> Pure, warm and changeless be
> A living fire!"

"Softly now the light of day" has been memorable to multitudes for nearly a hundred years. Palmer's Lamb of Cavalry, and its burning religious passion has been translated into no less than twenty languages. Not only for us, it must be said, but for Scotch and Cornish congregations, and in outpost churches set around the wild coasts of the earth our hymns of the nineteenth century have been a part of world-poetry. The verse of the times of '49—Her Letter—The Heathen Chinee are vivid in our nineteenth-century tradition. Then—of course—the great war lives for us again in the magnificence of Whitman's peace-loving war poetry, the heart-breaking gallop of Townsend's spent pony of the Southern Despatch rider, in

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the keen social criticism of Lowell's witty verse, and the white heat of Whittier's abolition fervor. We may read here some of the most capital political poetry in existence, akin to Pope's Satires and Byron's Vision of Judgment in its ability and acuteness quickened by a sharp, singing accent. The American poetry of the nineteenth century had the faculty of laughter—James Whitcomb Riley, and Charles Godfrey Leland with his warm-hearted German-Americans, the quick ironies of Bayard Taylor, the wild fun of Bret Harte and bizarre delight of Uncle Remus. Before 1900 Edwin Arlington Robinson had issued his two books, The Torrent and the Night Before and The Children of the Night, and Stephen Crane had printed Black Riders and War is Kind, all of these publications being significant for their own distinctive talent in poetic expression, as well as for their forecast of the future roads of the poetry of America.

A book which leaves unrepresented all the elements I have mentioned does not seem to me a compendious presentation. Besides, by printing more verse about Thoreau than poems of his own composition; by filling up the brief space devoted to Poe with a paraphrasing tribute to him by someone else, and with a poem by his fiancée; by leaving out of the Whitman contribution Whitman's war poetry and all his poetry referring to sex; by expunging from Lowell's fame as a poet, in these pages, all his humor and his political satires; by including some of Bayard Taylor's more formal, serious verse, and excluding his brilliant skill as a parodist, The Little Book of American Poets seems to me to give a remarkably colorless and frequently misleading and unscholarly impression of the writers whose work it presents. The selection offered is almost invariably that which is most like everything written by other poets; and least peculiar to the author's own genius and vision and musical style. Emerson and Bryant fare best in the collection in this respect; though Emerson by no means fares well, having an equivalent space in the volume with Thomas Buchanan Reade.

In determining as the editor seems to have determined that an element of humor is not among "the more enduring things" in our poetic literature, she has, I think, made a regrettable departure from the historic view of the anthology of antiquity. The Little Book of American Poets is a valuable example of a characteristic American idea of national poetry—the idea that animation in poetry is an unworthiness. By disregarding the humor of the poets represented, their musical style, and all their individual ideas of sex, society, politics and letters, the editor has done much to extend this ruling conception of poetry in our country. The volume will give pleasure to many people, among them certainly the reviewer. If not representative of American poets of the last century, it has yet a high representative value in expressing an American conception of poetry, widely prevalent both in the last century and in this.

E. W.

The World State

The Hope of the Great Community, by Josiah Royce. New York: The Macmillan Co. $1.00.

TO so gentle and kindly a man as the late Professor Royce the sinking of the Lusitania meant the collapse of his whole ethical world. We think now less often of these amazing logical subtleties of his or, with some new penetrating distinction, his gift for throwing light into the blackest of metaphysical jungles. It is

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

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

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pleasanter to remember how beneath that dazzling superstructure of scholarship and erudition lay a simple moral purpose. He wanted to justify the intangible loyalties of life, to give them an explicit order and intellectual content. In his last essay, a brief biographical sketch, there is a sort of pathos in his confession of a social clumsiness and ineptness, his failure to work in harmony with organizations or committees, and a hint that his whole philosophy was a slow compensatory growth to the final conception of the great community bound together by ties as indissoluble as the links of his own firm dialectic. It was this ideal of the great community which Germany had so wantonly attacked. The Lusitania was the tragic symbol, and throughout his last book flows the currents of his pain and anger. Yet even here he is consistent with a fine consistency. His anger does not master him; there are the harsh words of shock and grief, but not the harsher ones which cry for a rankling vengeance. To deny that Professor Royce was partisan would be to deny what has been true of most philosophers in all countries since the outbreak of the war, yet one may admire the temper of that partisanship which, all its instincts and habits and assumptions outraged, strives to be fair. On its spiritual side, the hope of the great community rests on the realization by all mankind of the basic sanity of the St. Paul doctrine of charity. On its business side, it will be knit together by new forms of international insurance of a non-political but world-embracing economic character. This conception of international insurance was, in an earlier book, Professor Royce's contribution to the reconstruction literature, evoked by the present anguish, and in this volume he meets one or two of the practical objections which corporation experts raised against it. Such a board of International Insurance Trustees would in no way conflict with any future League to Enforce Peace; but such a league's strongest sanction might come to be the economic interlacing of the new business. Unless the unity of commercial spirit and the unflinching loyalties which the pressure of war has stirred in the belligerent countries can also be preserved in a future pacific world, then, says Professor Royce, even war is preferable. No price is too high to pay for the destroying of complacency. It is admirable that in his last book Professor Royce was fair to what he hated—even to war. He never lacked the true courage of intellectual honesty.

Contributors

to this issue

O. M. W. Sprague is professor of banking and finance at Harvard University, and is the author of History of Crises Under the National Banking System, and Banking Reform in the United States.

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